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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Merkittävä osuus uusista sähköasemista ympäri maailman noudattaa kansainvälistä IEC 
61850 -sähköasemastandardia, joka määrittelee yhdenmukaisesti tietoliikennekäytännöt 
niiden elektronisten laitteiden välillä, joista sähköaseman automaatiojärjestelmä 
koostuu. Standardin menestys kasvattaa sen suosiota myös muissa sovelluksissa, ja sitä 
hyödynnetäänkin esimerkiksi tuulivoimaloissa, vesivoimalaitoksissa ja älykkäissä 
sähköverkoissa. Tämän diplomityön kannalta kiinnostavinta on IEC 61850 sovellettuna 
polttomoottoreiden ohjausjärjestelmän ja voimalaitoksen oheislaitteiden väliseen 
kommunikointiin. 
Tämän diplomityön tavoitteena on kerätä kokemusta IEC 61850 -standardin sisältämän 
GOOSE -kommunikointiprotokollan käytöstä. Työssä esitellään standardia ja siihen 
liittyviä käsitteitä yksinkertaisten esimerkkien avulla. Lisäksi on kehitetty Linux-
ympäristössä toimiva, avoimeen lähdekoodiin perustuva ohjelma, jonka avulla voidaan 
lähettää GOOSE -viestejä kahden eri laitteen välillä. Työn pääpaino on siis GOOSE- 
protokollan ja kehitetyn ohjelman esittelyssä. 
Tulokset osoittavat, että GOOSE -protokolla mahdollistaa yhteensopivan tiedonvaihdon 
kahden eri valmistajan laitteiden välillä, joten sitä voidaan pitää varteenotettavana 
vaihtoehtona lähitulevaisuuden kommunikointiprotokollaksi. IEC 61850 -standardia 
saatetaan hyvinkin ottaa lähitulevaisuudessa käyttöön polttomoottorivoimaloissa. 
Käyttöönoton aikataulu riippuu osittain markkinoiden kehityksestä sekä asiakkaiden 
asettamista vaatimuksista.  
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ABSTRACT 
The majority of the electrical substations built today conform to the international 
standard IEC 61850 that uniformly defines the communication between the various 
intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) of the substation automation system. The success 
of the standard in substation automation has expanded its application to new areas, such 
as wind power, hydro power, and smart grids. For this thesis, the most intriguing use of 
the standard is its application to the communication between the control system of 
internal combustion engines and other equipment in a power plant. 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to gain early experience on the use of the Generic 
Object Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE) protocol, which is often considered the 
most prominent communication protocol of IEC 61850. In this thesis, the standard IEC 
61850 is described, and its most fundamental concepts are illustrated by clear examples. 
An application based on open source software has been developed in the Linux-
environment in conjunction with this thesis. The application enables two IEDs from 
different manufacturers to exchange GOOSE messages. The emphasis of the thesis is 
thus on the presentation of the GOOSE protocol and the developed application. 
 
The results show that  the GOOSE protocol  provides compatible interfaces for 
information exchange  between  IEDs  provided by different manufacturers, and can  be 
seen as a viable option as a future communication protocol. IEC 61850 will likely be 
put into service in engine power plants, in the near future. The schedule partially 
depends on the development of the markets and the requirements of the customers. 
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ABSTRAKT 
Majoriteten av de elstationer som byggs idag tillämpar den internationella standarden 
IEC 61850 som enhetligt definierar kommunikationen mellan de intelligenta 
elektroniska apparater som utgör elstationens automationssystem. Eftersom IEC 61850 
har varit en framgångssaga i global skala ökar dess popularitet också inom alternativa 
användningsområden, till exempel vindkraft, vattenkraft och smarta elnät. För detta 
examensarbete ligger den mest intressanta tillämpningen av standarden i 
kommunikationen mellan styrsystemet för förbränningsmotorer och övrig utrustning i 
ett motorkraftverk. 
Målet med detta examensarbete är att samla erfarenhet kring tillämpningen av GOOSE -
protokollet, som ofta anses vara det viktigaste enskilda kommunikationsprotokollet i 
IEC 61850. I arbetet beskrivs standarden och dess koncept demonstreras med enkla 
exempel. En applikation baserad på öppen källkod har utvecklats i Linux-miljö i 
samband med detta examensarbete. Applikationen möjliggör kommunikation i form av 
GOOSE -meddelanden mellan två olika elektroniska apparater. Tyngdpunkten i 
examensarbetet ligger således på att beskriva GOOSE-protokollet och den utvecklade 
applikationen. 
Resultaten visar att GOOSE -protokollet tillåter kompatibelt informationsutbyte mellan 
olika elektroniska apparater från olika tillverkare, och kan anses som ett hållbart 
alternativ som framtidens kommunikationsprotokoll. IEC 61850 kommer sannolikt att 
tas i bruk i motorkraftverk i den närmaste framtiden. Tidtabellen för ibruktagningen 
beror delvist på marknadens utveckling samt på de krav som ställs av kunderna. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Electrical substations often have protection and control devices that have been produced 
by a variety of different manufacturers. Traditionally, different devices have used 
different types of communication protocols, making them inherently incompatible in 
networking. (IEC 61850-1 2003: 9.) 
The standard IEC 61850 presented by the International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC) was designed to standardize the communication between different intelligent 
electronic devices (IEDs). This has been done mainly by defining rules on how data 
should be modeled and organized in a way that is consistent across different devices. 
The standardization brings compatibility between different kinds of devices provided by 
different manufacturers and reduces the engineering effort required to configure the 
substation automation system (SAS). Although many modern electrical substations are 
built to conform to IEC 61850, the standard is also being used extensively in other 
applications, for example in wind and hydro power systems. (IEC 61850-1 2003: 9-10; 
Mackiewicz 2006.) 
This Master’s thesis was initiated by Wärtsilä Finland, Department of Automation and 
Control, as a part of a research project set to investigate the possibilities of integrating 
the standard IEC 61850 into the embedded electronic devices (modules) used for the 
control of reciprocating engines
2
. The goal is to get a more direct communication 
between the engine control system, which utilizes a proprietary protocol, and the 
supplementary systems, which already implement the Generic Object Oriented 
Substation Events (GOOSE) protocol. 
IEC 61850 specifies a set of logical nodes for the modeling of different functions in a 
SAS. Logical nodes suitable for the modeling of a reciprocating engine can be found in 
an extension to the standard, the IEC 61850-7-420, which contains specifications of 
logical nodes for the Distributed Energy Resources (DER) domain.  
                                                          
2
 Internal combustion engines running on for example methane gas or diesel. 
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In this thesis the IEC 61850 standard is studied, and the concepts are demonstrated 
using simple examples where possible. The material covered in this thesis is based on 
scientific research articles and on the standard itself. Several earlier theses dealing with 
similar topics were also studied. 
A simple application based on an open source platform was developed and run on one 
of Wärtsilä’s proprietary modules called LDU, which is short for Local Display Unit 20. 
The application enables the LDU to transmit and receive GOOSE messages over an 
Ethernet local area network (LAN). To verify that the LDU is capable of 
communicating with another IED from a different manufacturer, an interoperability test 
was set up where GOOSE messages were exchanged between the LDU and a Vamp 50 
protection relay provided by Vamp Ltd., Vaasa, Finland. The network traffic was 
monitored using the Wireshark Network Analyzer tool, and PuTTY, which is an SSH 
and telnet client. 
The results confirm that the GOOSE protocol can indeed be used for communication 
between IEDs provided by different manufacturers. The successful interoperability test 
justifies further research and development—the ultimate goal is to exploit the full 
potential of IEC 61850 in certain modules of the engine control system.  
This thesis, apart from the introduction, is divided into four chapters. Chapter 2 presents 
IEC 61850 as it applies to electrical substation automation. It introduces multiple 
standard-specific notions and serves to give the reader a basic understanding of IEC 
61850. Chapter 3 presents the practical work done in this thesis, where an application 
implementing GOOSE messaging was developed and tested. The hardware, software 
tools, and code development is briefly described. Chapter 4 presents the Abstract 
Communication Service Interface (ACSI), used for modeling the substation devices, the 
data to be exchanged between devices, and the services used for reading and writing 
attribute values in devices. The chapter also presents the Specific Communication 
Service Mappings (SCSMs), needed to map the abstract Application layer protocols of 
IEC 61850 to a concrete transport protocol (Ethernet). Chapter 5 presents the 
conclusions. It also brings up the difficulties that were met during the study of the 
standard, and concludes with a discussion of conformance testing. 
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2. IEC 61850 IN SUBSTATION AUTOMATION 
The international standard IEC 61850 ‘Communication networks and systems for power 
utility automation’3 consists of multiple different parts, and makes use of a variety of 
existing standards. Several other documents are also used in conjunction with the 
standard, like the extension IEC 61850-7-420 ‘Basic communication structure – 
Distributed energy resources logical nodes', the IEC 61850-9-2LE ‘Implementation 
guidelines for digital interface to instrument transformers using IEC 61850-9-2’, the 
IEC 62439-3 ‘High availability automation networks’4, and the IEC 61588 ‘Precision 
clock synchronization protocol for networked measurement and control systems’5. (IEC 
61850-1 2003: 10.)  
An SAS can be described as “a supervisory management and control system for 
industrial electrical distribution systems.” The SAS is implemented using a number of 
IEDs to perform the required functions, such as monitoring, protection, control, and 
data processing. ‘IED’ is a collective name for microprocessor-based devices with 
networking capabilities. An IED can be described as: “an instrumentation and control 
device that is capable of collecting and reacting to data and then use this data to create 
information.” Examples of common types of IEDs are protection relays, circuit breaker 
controllers and voltage regulators. To realize communication between different IEDs, a 
communication protocol is required. A protocol can be described as “a set of rules that 
must be obeyed for orderly communication between two or more parties.” For the 
communication to work, the IEDs need to be interoperable. Interoperability refers to the 
ability of devices to operate on the same network or communication path sharing the 
same information and commands. (Ozansoy 2006: 1, 13, 17; IEC 61850-1 2003: 9.) 
                                                          
3
 The first edition of IEC 61850 was known as ‘Communication networks and systems in substations’ 
but the name was changed in the second edition due to the expanded use of the standard. 
4
 Not considered in this thesis. 
5
 Corresponds to IEEE 1588. 
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2.1. The Open System Interconnection model 
The Open System Interconnection (OSI) 7-layer reference model, depicted in Figure 1, 
is based upon the concept of layering of communication functions, and is frequently 
used as a framework for describing how a layered protocol stack operates. Each layer in 
the reference model is responsible for specific tasks, and uses services offered by the 
layer below while providing services to the layer above. The communication between 
two adjacent layers is called an interface. The higher up in the stack a layer resides, the 
more abstract view it has on the lower layer implementation details. This improves the 
interoperability between the layers and between different network devices using 
different platforms and operating systems. It also facilitates network programming. OSI 
also recognizes the existence of application profiles (layers 5-7), and transport profiles 
(layers 1-4) in the OSI model. Different combinations of application profiles and 
transport profiles are used for the transmission of different types of messages. The 
profile combinations used for client/server and GOOSE (publisher/subscriber) 
messaging can be found in Appendix 1. Sockets are, in the UNIX domain, interfaces 
from the upper three layers into the Transport layer. (Scaglia 2007: 11-12; IEC 61850-
8-1 2011: 25; Stevens 1998: 18.) 
1. Physical Layer
2. Datalink Layer
3. Network Layer
4. Transport Layer
5. Session Layer
6. Presentation Layer
7. Application Layer
Application Profile
Transport Profile
Sockets
Application 
details
Communication 
details
 
Figure 1. The layered OSI reference model. (Adapted from Stevens 1998: 18.) 
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2.2. Networking in substation automation 
The functional hierarchy of a substation can be conceptually divided into three different 
levels: the station, bay, and process level. Figure 2 depicts the functional hierarchy the 
way it was perceived by the author (the figure is actually a compilation of several 
different figures from different sources). Application functions of the SAS can be 
distributed between IEDs on the same, or at different levels of the functional hierarchy. 
The free allocation of functions to IEDs enables different approaches in function 
integration, function distribution, and substation automation architecture. (IEC 61850-1 
2003: 12-14; Yashwant & Swarup 2011.) 
Station bus
Process level
Control
IED
Protection
IED
Merging
unit
Control
IED
Protection
IED
Merging
unit
Process bus 
Station level
Bay level
Operator’s
workplace
Engineering/ 
monitoring
Breaker
IED
Sampled 
Values
Bay 
Q1
Bay 
Q2
Breaker
IED
GOOSE
(undefined)
Gateway for 
remote operation 
over a WAN
GPS clock 
synchronization
GOOSE
GOOSE
Sampled 
Values
Client/server
GOOSE
Client/server
 
Figure 2. Conceptual model of a distributed protection system of an electrical 
substation conforming to IEC 61850. The arrows show where the different message 
types of IEC 61850 travels. (Adapted from Schnakofsky 2011: 16.) 
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The process level relates to collecting data and status information from the primary 
equipment (e.g. instrument transformers, circuit breakers etc.) in a bay, as well as to 
operating on the primary equipment, e.g. tripping of circuit breakers, control of 
disconnecting switches etc. (Janssen & Apostolov 2008; Xyngi & Popov 2010.) 
The bay level consists of separate bays each with control, protection and monitoring 
devices, i.e., secondary equipment. A ‘bay’ is a collective name for a power system 
subset consisting of closely connected subparts with some common functionality, like a 
circuit breaker and its associated isolators, earth switches, and instrument transformers, 
or a transformer with its related switchgear between two busbars representing two 
different voltage levels. Each (medium voltage) feeder cubicle inside the substation 
control house typically counts as a bay, where the control and protection functions are 
typically performed by the same IED.  In a high voltage bay, for example in the 
switchyard, the control and protection functions are typically performed by different 
IEDs—the controller IED being called “bay controller”. (IEC 61850-1 2003: 7, 14; 
Ingram, Schaub & Campbell 2011; Starck 2012.) 
The station level is the station supervisory level that holds the station computer, which 
contains among other things a human-machine interface (HMI), i.e., a Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, with which the operator can monitor 
and control the substation. The station level generally also has interfaces for remote 
communication and Global Positioning System (GPS) clock synchronization. (IEC 
61850-1 2003: 14.) 
The station bus and the process bus (see Figure 2) are key concepts in IEC 61850. They 
are defined by IEC 61850-8-1 and IEC 61850-9-2, respectively. The station bus and the 
process bus are usually perceived as two physically separate networks, although it is 
possible to have them share the same network infrastructure, i.e., an Ethernet LAN. 
Both networks can therefore be used to transmit IEC 61850-specific message types like  
 time-critical connectionless multicast data stream of Sampled Values (SV) 
mapped directly onto Ethernet frames on the DataLink layer,  
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 time-critical connectionless multicast GOOSE messages mapped directly onto 
Ethernet frames on the DataLink layer, 
 non-time-critical, connection-oriented, unicast client/server messages mapped to 
the Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) protocol that operates over the 
Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) and Ethernet stack. 
The Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) and Precision Time Protocol (PTPv2) time 
synchronisation protocols are typically used to provide the time synchronization in 
substations conforming to IEC 61850. SNTP can be used where high precision is not 
required, and is sometimes used in the station bus. PTPv2 is capable of the sub-
microsecond precision required by GOOSE and SV messaging, and is therefore used in 
the process bus. Time synchronization is left outside of this thesis. (McGhee & Goraj 
2010; Ingram, Schaub & Campbell 2012; IEC 61850-9-2 2011: 16.) 
The different message types are typically assigned different VLAN (Virtual LAN) 
identifiers and priority levels. VLAN allows an Ethernet switch to deliver information 
only to those switch ports/IEDs that have subscribed to the data. The time-critical 
GOOSE and SV messages are expected to deliver data fast and reliably and should 
therefore be assigned a higher priority than non-time-critical messages. High priority 
messages get processed ahead of low priority messages in switch queues. (Ingram, 
Schaub & Campbell 2011; Mackiewicz 2006; Xyngi & Popov 2010.)  
A substation usually has one global station bus but multiple process buses, one for each 
bay. As depicted in Figure 2, the IEDs residing at the bay level are simultaneously 
connected to both the station bus and the process bus via independent network 
interfaces. The process and station busses are typically realized as Fast Ethernet (100 
Mbps) full-duplex fibre optic Ethernet LANs. The process bus might have to be realized 
as Gigabit Ethernet (1000 Mbps or more) to accommodate the network traffic. The 
station bus is used for communication between 
 different devices residing at the station level, 
 devices residing at the station level and devices residing at the bay level (vertical 
communication), and 
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 devices residing in different bays (horizontal communication). 
The process bus interconnects all IEDs within a bay, and is used for the communication 
between devices residing at the bay and process levels, e.g. between the primary and 
secondary equipment. (Liang & Campbell 2008; Ingram, Schaub & Campbell 2011; 
Janssen & Apostolov 2008; Xyngi & Popov 2010; De Mesmaeker, Rietmann, Brand & 
Reinhardt 2005; McGhee & Goraj 2010; Moore, Midence & Goraj 2010; Moore & 
Goraj 2011.) 
A merging unit (see Figure 2) is an IED residing at the process level that collects data 
from both conventional (passive) and non-conventional (microprocessor-based) current 
transformers and voltage transformers, as well as binary status information from the I/O 
units of primary devices such as circuit breakers and other switchgear. It also acquires 
analogue values from other transducers and sensors. The merging unit need not 
necessarily be a standalone unit as it can be integrated into non-conventional instrument 
transformers. (Moore & Goraj 2011; IEC 61850-9-1 2003: 29.) 
The merging unit in a 50 Hz system continuously samples the input values at a rate of 
80 samples per cycle for protection applications and 256 samples per cycle for power 
quality monitoring and waveform recording applications, as specified by the IEC 
61850-9-2LE guideline document. The Sampled Values receive a timestamp and are 
transmitted as a continuous stream over the process bus. The merging unit transmits 
4000 messages per second, which results in a traffic rate of 4.4 Mbps. (Moore & Goraj 
2011; Ingram, Schaub & Campbell 2011.) 
The process bus conveys the SVs from the process level to the bay level, and GOOSE 
messages from the bay level to the process level. The SV messages are processed by the 
subscribing protection and control devices, which can then take appropriate actions like 
sending GOOSE messages to trip a breaker. The digitized SVs must be received fast, in 
synchronism, and without any interruptions by the protection devices in order for the 
protection algorithms to function properly. (Ingram, Schaub & Campbell 2011; Moore 
& Goraj 2011; Janssen & Apostolov 2008.) 
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The station bus conveys non-time-critical messages by the client/server communication 
profile between devices at the station level, and between devices at the station and bay 
levels. To reach devices at the process level, the messages are forwarded over the 
process bus. Therefore supervision and maintenance of the devices connected to the 
process bus can be handled from the HMI and the substation gateway connected to the 
station bus. The station bus also conveys time-critical GOOSE messages with critical 
protection information between bays, nominally at a 4 kHz sample rate. The GOOSE 
message contents can be binary (e.g. interlocking or blocking), or transduced analogue 
values (e.g. measurement information.) (Moore & Goraj 2011; Ingram, Schaub & 
Campbell 2011; Kirrmann, Rietmann & Kunsmann 2008; Antonova, Frisk & Tournier 
2011.) 
Both SV and GOOSE messages are published as multicast messages. The multicast 
publishing model is connectionless, which means that the publisher will not receive any 
acknowledgement of a successfully delivered message from the subscribing devices. 
However, multicasting of messages is efficient and enables high levels of real-time 
traffic over the process bus. The SVs are normally not allowed to enter the station bus 
as they consume bandwidth and load IEDs that do not require receiving the SV stream. 
The client/server communication utilizes the TCP/IP protocol suite, which guarantees 
the delivery of unicast messages. These messages might be for instance settings and file 
transfers. (Antonova, Frisk & Tournier 2011; Ingram, Schaub & Campbell 2011.) 
High levels of multicast message traffic might flood the network and affect the 
performance of protection IEDs and PTPv2 clocks. If the level of traffic exceeds the 
network capacity or the capacity of the subscribers to process messages, multicast 
address filtering can be used in the Ethernet switches. Multicast address filtering 
restricts the SV and GOOSE traffic to defined subsets of subscribers. The switches need 
to ensure that the traffic rate does not exceed 100 Mbps as this is the maximum rate that 
the links and the Fast Ethernet interfaces of the IEDs can manage without degradation in 
performance. (Ingram, Schaub & Campbell 2011.) 
GOOSE messaging enables simple testing and simulation of the SAS as any GOOSE 
message can be monitored and reproduced using a laptop PC, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Complicated and substation-wide virtual testing such as breaker fail trip can be 
performed without setting up any temporary wiring. The laptop can be used to send 
GOOSE messages to the system, and to monitor the results via GOOSE or MMS 
message reports. (Bekker, Diamandis & Tibbals 2010.) 
 
Figure 3. Laptop sending simulation GOOSE messages and monitoring system 
GOOSE messages during the testing of an SAS. (Bekker, Diamandis & Tibbals 
2010.) 
2.3. Interoperability and interchangeability 
Part 7-1 of the standard states the following: “The goal of the IEC 61850 series is to 
provide interoperability between the IEDs from different suppliers or, more precisely, 
between functions to be performed by systems for power utility automation but residing 
in equipment from different suppliers.” Interoperability refers to the ability of the 
interfaces of two different systems to cooperate—what this means in practice is that the 
IEDs involved provide comparable functionalities, and that an IED in a system can be 
replaced by another IED from the same or another manufacturer through a limited 
amount of reconfiguration effort. The integration effort required to make two systems 
cooperate depends on the specification of the interfaces: the more compatible the 
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interfaces are the less integration effort is required. The level of compatibility is denoted 
as ‘integration distance’ in Figure 4. (IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 10; Dawidczak & Englert 
2010.) 
 Plug’n play =
Interchangeability
 Interfaces use common 
data and service model 
= Interoperability
Interfaces can be mapped or 
transformed
No standards available, requires 
full custom integration
Integration distance
IED 1 IED 2
Proprietary protocols
Standard protocols
IEC 61850
Ultimate goal
 
Figure 4. Integration distance between IEDs from different vendors. The longer the 
distance, the more engineering effort is required to make devices interoperable. 
(Adapted from Dawidczak & Englert 2010.) 
One important thing to realize is that IEC 61850 does not cover the interchangeability 
among devices, which refers to the highest level of compatibility where an IED in a 
system can be replaced by another IED from another manufacturer without making any 
changes to the other elements in the system. To reach interchangeability, a 
standardization of the interfaces, functions, and algorithms is required, but as IEC 
61850 clearly states, the standardization of functions is beyond its scope. 
Interchangeability can currently be achieved only between identical IEDs. (Dawidczak 
& Englert 2010; IEC 61850-1 2003: 9-10.) 
2.4. Distributed functions and logical nodes 
All known application functions of an SAS have been identified in IEC 61850. These 
functions are control and supervision, as well as protection and monitoring of the 
primary equipment and of the grid. The functions are composed of multiple 
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subfunctions, such as individual measurement and control functions implemented in 
different IEDs. The functions of an SAS may therefore be split into their constitutional 
functional parts. An IED, called physical device in this context, can be configured to 
implement one or more functions. (IEC 61850-1 2003: 12, 14; IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 16, 
17.) 
The decomposition process of IEC 61850 decomposes the application functions of an 
SAS into the smallest function parts which exchange data: the logical nodes. A logical 
node can be described as a virtual representation, or functional model, of a real device. 
For example, the logical node  represents a real circuit breaker, modeled as a 
function. The logical nodes may be allocated to different physical devices at the same, 
or different levels of the functional hierarchy (see Figure 2). The allocation is not fixed 
and any allocation should be supported by the standard. After the allocation, the logical 
nodes residing in the different physical devices can exchange information over the 
network through information exchange services. The information exchange requires that 
the physical devices are interoperable. The logical nodes can take on the client/server or 
publisher/subscriber roles, depending on the type of application. (IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 
17, 27, 77; IEC 61850-1 2003: 12, 14; Ozansoy 2006: 41-42.)  
The logical node concept is illustrated in Figure 5. Each physical device () contains a 
logical node zero ( which refers to the information regarding the device itself. The 
logical nodes (s) are allocated to functions () and physical devices. The logical 
nodes are linked by logical connections (), and the physical devices are linked by 
physical connections (s). Each logical node is a part of a physical device, and each 
logical connection is a part of a physical connection. The System Configuration 
description Language (SCL), described in Section 2.6, is needed to control the 
allocation of the logical nodes to physical devices. (IEC 61850-5 2003: 20-21.)  
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Figure 5. The logical node and link concept, where  = substation function,  = 
logical node,  = physical device,  = physical connection,  = logical 
connection. The logical nodes that make up a function can be freely distributed to 
different physical devices. (IEC 61850-5 2003: 21.)  
The logical connections between the logical nodes can be direct, indirect, or even a 
combination of the two, i.e., client/server, SV, and GOOSE messaging individually or 
combined. The whole substation communication system is built as a distributed system 
consisting of a collection of interacting logical nodes that are logically connected by 
logical connections. In case of a failure of a logical node or a related link, a function 
might get blocked completely, or show a graceful degradation
6
. (Liang & Campbell 
2008; IEC 61850-1 2003: 14.) 
A function which is performed by two or more logical nodes that are residing in 
different physical devices is called a distributed function. The logical connection, or 
communication, between these logical nodes, when modelled in SCL, is called data 
flow. IEC 61850-1 states the following: “Data flow is used to understand the 
communication interfaces that must support the exchange of information between 
                                                          
6
 The ability of a computer or network to maintain limited functionality even when a large portion 
of it has been destroyed or rendered inoperative. (SearchNetworking 2013.) 
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distributed functional components and the functional performance requirements.” The 
existence of a distributed function is thus determined by the modelled data flow. (IEC 
61850-1 2003: 12, 14; Blair 2013.) 
Several logical nodes, residing in the same physical device, build a logical device, i.e., 
the logical device is basically a container containing a group of logical nodes 
representing some related functions. A logical device always contains a logical node 
zero (), which represents common data of the logical device. The mode of  
is used to control the mode of the logical device and all the logical nodes it consists of. 
For example, when the function of a logical device is disabled, all the logical nodes it 
consists of will be disabled as well. A logical device may also contain a logical node 
physical device
7
 (), which represents common data of the physical device hosting 
the logical device. Logical nodes thus describe the distributed functions, the 
subfunctions, and the functional interfaces of an SAS.  (IEC 61850-1 2003: 12, 14; IEC 
61850-7-1 2011: 17, 27, 64; IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 17, 38.) 
An example of an over-current protection function consists of four communicating 
logical nodes, as illustrated in Figure 6. The current is measured by a current 
transformer and the sampled analogue values are communicated by the current 
transformer logical node, . When logical node  (instantaneous overcurrent) 
detects that the current grows beyond a certain limit, it signals the logical node  
(switch controller), which in turn activates  (circuit breaker), and the circuit 
breaker contact opens. (Ozansoy 2006: 42; IEC 61850-7-4 2010: 34, 66, 97, 105.) 
 
                                                          
7
  shall be defined in at least one logical device. (IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 64.) 
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Figure 6. A simple example of an over-current protection function realized as a group 
of communicating logical nodes. (Ozansoy 2006: 42.) 
2.5. The information class model of IEC 61850 
A physical device may host zero or more servers
8
. A physical device may also contain 
one or more logical devices, which may or may not belong to a server. A logical device 
may contain a few or more logical nodes, i.e., an , possibly an , and one or 
more logical nodes representing functions. A logical device is always implemented in 
one physical device; therefore logical devices do not contain logical nodes from 
different physical devices. Each logical node contains one or more data objects, which 
represent meaningful information of applications located in a physical device. Each data 
object contains an application-specific set of dedicated data attributes, and therefore 
correspond to structured application data. Data attributes are the logical correspondence 
to physical entities, and may represent memory units, registers, communication ports, 
etc., presented as elementary parameter values. (Mackiewicz 2006; IEC 61850-7-1 
2011: 17, 64, 76, 85; Liang & Campbell 2008; IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 38, 45; IEC 61850-
6 2009: 57.) 
                                                          
8
 A server is basically a program running on a physical device. (Liang & Campbell 2008). 
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The hierarchical structure described above leads to an object oriented information class 
model, depicted in Figure 7, which is used to describe a real substation device. The 
information class model, as well as the information exchange between devices, was 
designed to be independent of any concrete implementation, and is therefore referred to 
as abstract. An abstract model needs to be mapped to a concrete protocol stack through 
a Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) to become usable. The 
information class model, the information exchange services, and the SCSMs are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, ‘The abstract communication service interface’. 
(IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 17, 53; Ozansoy 2006: 37.) 
SERVER
LOGICAL DEVICE
LOGICAL DEVICE
LOGICAL DEVICE
...
LOGICAL DEVICE
LOGICAL NODE
LOGICAL NODE
LOGICAL NODE
...
LOGICAL NODE
DATA OBJECT
DATA OBJECT
DATA OBJECT
...
DATA OBJECT
DATA ATTRIBUTE
DATA ATTRIBUTE
DATA ATTRIBUTE
...
 
Figure 7. Hierarchy of the information class model of IEC 61850. A physical device 
may host zero or more servers, each of which “contains” one or more logical 
devices. Each logical device contains one or more logical nodes. Each logical node 
contains one or more data objects. Each data object contains a set of data attributes. 
(Adapted from Liang & Campbell 2008.) 
2.6. The System Configuration description Language 
The System Configuration description Language
9
 (SCL) is used to describe the 
substation infrastructure, the SAS, and the communication between IEDs. The main 
purpose of the SCL is to exchange IED capability descriptions and SAS descriptions 
between IED engineering tools and the system engineering tool(s) from different 
                                                          
9
 Formerly known as the Substation Configuration Language. 
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vendors in a compatible way.  The SCL is based on XML
10
 and its semantics are 
defined by the IEC 61850 XML Schema. An XML Schema specifies the structure of 
valid XML documents. (IEC 61850-6 2009: 8; Blair 2012: 7; Goldberg 2009: 114.) 
The electrical topology of the substation can be described by a single line diagram, 
which contains the different voltage levels, transformers, bays, busses, switchgear etc. 
Annex C of IEC 61850-6 defines an SCL syntax extension that can be used for 
displaying the power system electrical topology as a drawing. This facilitates the 
development of applications for visualizing the power system, the location of IEDs, and 
their communication services. The visualization could then be linked to real-time data 
from IEDs, creating a substation monitoring application. (IEC 61850-6 2009: 153; 
Blair, Coffele, Booth & Burt 2012; Apostolov 2010.) 
 
2.6.1. Configuration tools and SCL file types 
The IED Configuration Tool is a manufacturer-specific, and possibly also IED-specific, 
software tool that is responsible for the data model of the IED. It generates IED-specific 
configuration files. The System Configuration Tool is an IED-independent system level 
tool that is responsible for the communication addressing and data flow between IEDs. 
It generates substation-related configuration files.  The data flow is modelled by a list of 
signals that are the input of a logical node. If several logical nodes need to access the 
input data, it should be mapped to the  which represents the whole logical device. 
A System Specification Tool is used to generate files that specify the substation structure 
by a single line diagram. (IEC 61850-6 2009: 12, 15, 26.) 
There are several different subtypes of the SCL file used for the data exchange between 
the different configuration tools. These different file types can be distinguished by their 
file extensions—the extension being the name of the file type. The configuration tools 
                                                          
10
 eXtensible Markup Language v1.0 
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parse the SCL files and validate the SCL syntax and structure using IEC 61850-specific 
XML Schema files. Each SCL file should contain a version and revision number to 
distinguish different versions of the same file. This means that each tool has to keep the 
version and revision number information of the last file exported, or read back the last 
existing file to find out its version. Figure 8 depicts the substation configuration 
process
11
 with the different tools and SCL file types involved. (IEC 61850-6 2009: 26-
27; Yongli, Dewen, Yan & Wenqing 2009.) 
 
Figure 8. Conceptual substation configuration process using different software tools 
and different kinds of SCL files. The configuration of a substation is an iterative 
process where the different SCL files get exchanged between the engineering tools. 
(Aguilar & Ariza 2010.) 
The contents of an SCL file can be conceptually divided into five different sections, 
each describing a distinct part of the system. The sections are called header, substation, 
communication system, IED, and data type templates. The header section provides 
information and processing instructions to the XML parser, for example information on 
which XML Schema shall be used when validating the file. The substation section 
describes the functional structure of the substation and identifies the primary devices 
and their electrical connections. The IED section describes the configuration of an IED 
and its communication services. The communication system section describes the 
                                                          
11
 Described in Section 2.6.2 
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possibilities of direct communication between logical nodes by means of subnetworks 
and Service Access Points
12
 (SAPs). The data type templates define the instantiable 
logical node types, data object types, data attributes, and enumerate data types. (Yun 
2011.)  
The IED Capability Description (ICD) file is used when data is transferred from the 
IED Configuration Tool to the System Configuration Tool. The file must contain an 
IED section, which describes the functional capabilities of the IED, and a data type 
templates section, which describes the data types instantiated in the IED. As the IED 
has not been configured for the project, its name shall be TEMPLATE. The ICD file 
may also contain an optional substation section, where the substation name shall be 
TEMPLATE, and a communication section, defining possible default addresses of the 
IED. IEC 61850 does not specify from where the ICD file should originate. In the 
general case, it is stored in the IED’s memory at the factory. Another possibility is that 
the vendor provides software tools that output the ICD file. (IEC 61850-6 2009: 26; 
Apostolov 2010; Yun 2011.) 
The Instantiated IED Description (IID) file is also used in the data transfer from the IED 
Configuration Tool to the System Configuration Tool. It describes a single IED 
configured for the project, IED instance value changes, or data model modifications. If 
the IED has a project specific name it may also have project specific addresses, a data 
model with preconfigured DataSet
13
 definitions, and logical nodes linked to the project 
specific single line diagram. IID files are used for IEDs whose number of logical node 
instances depends on the single line diagram or on other IEDs. (IEC 61850-6 2009: 26-
27.) 
The System Specification Description (SSD) file is used in the data transfer from a 
System Specification Tool to the System Configuration Tool. It describes the substation 
                                                          
12
 Abstraction of a network address by which a device is connected to a subnetwork. 
13
 A list of references to data attributes the values of which shall be sent as a GOOSE or SV message. 
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by a single line diagram and the functional requirements represented by logical nodes. 
The file contains a substation section, and may contain the required data type templates 
and logical node definitions. The logical nodes allocated to the substation section that 
are not yet allocated to specific IEDs shall have the IED name reference set to ‘None’.  
(IEC 61850-6 2009: 27.) 
The System Configuration Description (SCD) file is used in the data transfer from the 
System Configuration Tool to the IED Configuration Tool(s). It contains the definitions 
of all IEDs and information regarding data flow, data types, communication 
configurations, and substation description. The IEDs in the SCD file have been further 
configured from their default state to operate within the SAS. The SCD files can be 
used to configure the individual IEDs. (IEC 61850-6 2009: 27; Apostolov 2010.) 
The Configured IED Description (CID) file is used in the data transfer from the IED 
Configuration Tool to an IED. The file is a stripped down SCD file, i.e., it represents a 
single IED section of the SCD file, thus providing a restricted view of the source IEDs. 
It describes the communication related part of an instantiated IED within a project, and 
contains the substation specific names and addresses. (IEC 61850-6 2009: 27.) 
2.6.2. The substation configuration process 
In the substation configuration (engineering) process, the different SCL files are 
exchanged between the different configuration tools. The tools are in general not 
allowed to modify the files they import; instead they use the information from the 
imported files to generate a new type of file, as depicted in Figure 8. The IED 
Configuration Tool begins the configuration process by importing an ICD file from an 
IED, or by creating a new ICD file. The IED Configuration Tool can access the internal 
functions of an IED, and is needed to set up the following features (IEC 61850-6 2009: 
15; Aguilar & Ariza 2010):  
 Logic and trip equations 
 Graphical display on an IED’s HMI 
 Internal mappings 
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 Non-IEC 61850 parameters 
The System Configuration Tool imports the preconfigured ICD file which can be 
described as an IED template, and instantiates a project specific IED. Another 
alternative is to import an IID file, representing a preconfigured IED or an IED to which 
modifications have been made during the configuration process. The tool also obtains 
the substation structure from an SSD file created by the System Specification Tool. 
After the extraction of the required data from the ICD and SSD files, an SCD file 
describing the complete substation configuration, is generated. GOOSE messages can 
be configured by specifying the publishers and subscribers of messages. (Aguilar & 
Ariza 2010; IEC 61850-6 2009: 14-15; Yashwant & Swarup 2011.) 
The SCD file is then imported by the IED Configuration Tool, which extracts the 
information needed for a specific IED from the file. The extracted information becomes 
the content of a CID file, i.e., the CID file describes an instantiated IED with device 
specific configuration data. The CID file is then uploaded to the IED. The use of a CID 
file to configure an IED is optional. (IEC 61850-6 2009: 15; Aguilar & Ariza 2010; 
Yashwant & Swarup 2011.) 
If IED related data has to be changed during the configuration process, an IID file can 
be used to update the IED data within the system. In the next iteration of the 
configuration process, the IID file is imported by the System Configuration Tool. In 
case the IED described by the IID file does not exist in the SCD file, it can be imported 
and instantiated as a project specific IED without any (data flow) references to other 
IEDs. The required references need to be established by the System Configuration Tool, 
which then generates the next revision of the SCD file. If the IED already exists in the 
SCD file, the data model part and its values in the IID file replaces the old values in the 
SCD file. (IEC 61850-6 2009: 14-15.) 
2.6.3. Structure of the SCL file 
Examples of the different sections of the SCL file will be presented next. The examples 
are taken from the SCD file of the GOOSE software project that will be introduced in 
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Chapter 3. The project involves no substation as it merely consists of two IEDs 
interconnected through a switch. The examples, although somewhat incomplete, show 
the most important concepts of the SCL. The complete SCD file used in the GOOSE 
software project can be found in Appendix 2.  
An example of the header section is given in Figure 9. The first line of an SCL 
document always contains the XML declaration element, enclosed in the  and  
characters. XML attributes are used to include additional information to the element. 
The attribute  denotes which version of XML that is being used, and the 
attribute  indicates the method in which characters are encoded.  stands 
for Unicode Transformation Format (8-bit). This specification is required by XML 
software to able to display characters in the Unicode character set correctly on the 
screen.  (Goldberg 2009: 4, 251-252). 
 
Figure 9. An example of the header section of an SCL file. The default namespace, 
, is IEC 61850-specific. 
The second line in Figure 9 introduces the root element, which is the main XML 
element that contains all other elements. The name of the root element is SCL, 
indicating that the file is an SCL document. XML elements are always enclosed inside 
angle brackets. The attribute , which is an abbreviation for XML namespace, 
indicates the default namespace for the SCL document. A namespace is a collection of 
related elements and attributes, identified by a namespace name. Names that are part of 
one namespace do not interfere with the same names that are part of another namespace. 
In other words, two elements can be assigned the same name if they belong to different 
namespaces. The namespace name, i.e., the value of attribute , must be unique, 
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permanent, and written in the form of a URI
14
, typically in URL
15
 format. The URL 
does not need to point to an actual file—URLs are used because they are unique. XML 
software does not even try to locate whatever the URL is pointing to. (Goldberg 2009: 
4, 116, 164-165, 169.)  
The name of the namespace is used by the XML parser to associate the SCL document 
with a specific XML Schema. The default namespace name for an SCL document is 
 which is the namespace specified by IEC 
containing all the XML elements
16
, attributes, and data types that can be used in the 
creation of a valid SCL file. The semantics and structure of the SCL file will thus be 
validated against the IEC 61850 XML Schema defined in IEC 61850-6. (Goldberg 
2009: 116, 170.) 
Prefixes are used as shorthand for the namespace names. The combination  in 
the root element declares the prefix  which refers to the unique URL 
. The prefix is used to label 
individual elements, i.e., to assign elements to a particular namespace.  would thus 
be used to label any valid XML Schema element not belonging to the IEC 61850-
specific XML Schema. Elements without a prefix belong to the default namespace. 
(Goldberg 2009: 165-166, 169.)    
An example of the communication section of an SCL file is given in Figure 10. The 
communication system consists of a subnetwork named .  is of type  
which refers to part 8-1 of the standard, i.e., the station bus. The given bitrate of 10 b/s 
is apparently incorrect—the correct XML element for a Fast Ethernet network is 
. A physical device named 
                                                          
14
 Uniform Resource Identifier 
15
 Uniform Resource Locator 
16
 Element definitions and descriptions of element attributes can be found in IEC 61850-6. 
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 is connected to the subnetwork via a SAP named . A GSE (GOOSE) control 
block named , contained in logical device  of , needs to be assigned 
(IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 143; IEC 61850-6 2009: 81): 
 a multicast address from the address range specified for GOOSE in Annex B of 
IEC 61850-8-1,  
 an  (application identifier) which is a system wide unique identification 
of the application to which the GOOSE message belongs, and 
 a VLAN priority value of 4, as is commonly used for GOOSE and SV messages. 
 
Figure 10. An example of the communication section of an SCL file. The 
communication system consists of a subnetwork of station bus type. For brevity, 
only one connected IED is shown. The IP address of the IED is needed as well as 
the multicast address, application ID, and VLAN priority used by the GSE control 
block contained in the IED. 
An example of the IED section is given in Figure 11, where the hierarchies of the IEDs 
involved are clearly distinguishable from the SCL code. IED  is connected to a 
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subnetwork through a SAP named .17 The SAP has a server containing the 
mandatory element , and a logical device named .  
defines, in case of a device description, the authentication possibilities, and in the case 
of an instantiated device, the methods to be used for authentication. (IEC 61850-6 2009: 
68.)  contains two logical nodes, the  and the , which are instances of the 
logical node classes  and , respectively.  has a DataSet named  
which references data attribute , which resides in the data object  of 
logical node . A DataSet can contain references to data objects or data attributes 
in any logical node on the same server where the DataSet itself is defined. (IEC 61850-
7-2 2010: 63.) The DataSet is governed by the GSE control block .18 The 
logical node  has two inputs, each referencing a data attribute called . 
These are two separate data attributes residing in two separate logical nodes in IED 
. 
IED  mainly follows the same structure, except that the logical node  
contains both a DataSet and an external reference. The DataSet  references the 
two data attributes called  residing in the logical nodes  and 
. The names of these two logical nodes can be derived from the 
concatenation of the prefixes  and , the logical node class , and the 
suffixes  and . For brevity, they were left out from the example. The input 
references data attribute  of IED . The same data attribute is also 
referenced by DataSet of IED . An input in one device can “externally 
reference” only a data object/attribute which is referenced by (included in) a DataSet of 
the “external” device. It is very important that these cross-references (dataflow) between 
DataSets in one device and inputs in another device are configured correctly. 
 
                                                          
17
 No services were defined; the names of any services should be listed between the IED name and 
the SAP name. Consult IEC 61850-6 for examples. 
18
 A DataSet and the control block that governs it do not need to have the same name. 
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Figure 11. An example of the IED section of an SCL file. Notice the use of references 
between DataSets in one IED and inputs ) in the other IED.  
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An example of the data type templates section of an SCL file is given in Figure 12. The 
data type templates section lists the instantiable logical node types, data object types, 
data attributes, and enumerated types. The logical node  is instantiated from the 
compatible logical node class , and it contains a data object named . 
 is of type (is derived from) , which is merely a subset of the data 
attributes contained in the common data class — implements only the 
mandatory data attributes  (a Boolean value),  (quality), and  (timestamp), 
required for instantiation of the  class. These data attributes are functionally 
constrained by the functional constraint value  (status). The attributes  (data 
change) and  (quality change) are the trigger options, i.e., the reasons that trigger 
the automatic sending of a GOOSE message containing the values of the data attributes 
that are referenced by the DataSet belonging to the GSE (GOOSE) control block. More 
details will be given in Chapter 4, ‘The Abstract Communication Service Interface’. 
 
Figure 12. An example of the data type templates section of an SCL file. It contains 
templates for the instantiable logical node types, data object types, data attributes, 
and enumerated data types. 
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3. THE GOOSE SOFTWARE APPLICATION 
The goal for the practical part of this thesis was to realize interoperable GOOSE 
communication between two different IEDs. A simple application based on an open 
source platform was developed in order to enable communication between a Wärtsilä 
Local Display Unit 20 (LDU) and a Vamp 50 overcurrent and earthfault protection 
relay. A small Ethernet LAN was established by interconnecting the LDU and Vamp 
relay through a switch, which was configured to strip the VLAN tags from the Ethernet 
packets. The network traffic was monitored with Wireshark and PuTTY that were 
running on a laptop PC. PuTTY was also used to start up the GOOSE application in the 
LDU. The hardware setup is illustrated in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. The hardware setup. The LDU and Vamp IEDs communicate over an 
Ethernet network through a switch and the network traffic is monitored by 
Wireshark running on a laptop PC. 
The LDU is based on the PowerPC processor architecture, and has a particular 
distribution of the Linux operating system running on it. The open source Oracle VM 
Virtualbox platform is capable of simulating the Linux development environment used 
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for creating software for the LDU. The development environment was used on the 
laptop to cross-compile code for the LDU. The following sections present the software 
used in the development of the GOOSE messaging application. Chapter 3 is concluded 
by a brief discussion of the results. 
3.1. The Rapid61850 platform 
 is a software platform developed at the University of Strathclyde, 
Glasgow, UK. It is stated to be the first open source implementation of IEC 61850, and 
its main intended application is to implement IEDs for rapid prototyping of protection, 
control, and automation systems in both research and education. The idea is that the 
system designer can focus on the design and implementation of the protection scheme, 
rather than on the underlying communications infrastructure. The platform, which is 
based on the Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF), takes a System Configuration 
Description (SCD) file as an input, and automatically generates the low-level 
communications code required for implementing GOOSE and Sampled Values 
messaging in the C programming language. The generated communication stack is 
hardcoded and therefore very efficient at run-time—the IED does not need to interpret 
the SCD file at run-time or maintain an internal model of the SCD. (Blair 2012; Blair, 
Booth & Burt 2011a; Blair, Coffele, Booth & Burt 2012). 
The code generation process is depicted in Figure 14. The EMF automatically generates 
a Java model of the IEC 61850 XML Schema. It also generates an XML parser, tailored 
to the Schema, for parsing SCD files. An SCD file is then imported to the EMF 
platform, and the XML parser performs syntactical and semantic validation of the SCD 
file. The validation process is separate from the code generation process and extensively 
uses the EMF Model Query framework for searching and filtering SCD data. After 
successful validation, the parser generates an instance of a hierarchical model 
containing Java objects. The objects are automatically populated with data from the 
SCD file, and the model can be further manipulated in software. Java Emitter Templates 
(JET) files are then used to transform the Java model instance into a C implementation. 
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The JET files define the generic structure of the C source and header files. The 
generated C code implements all IEDs specified in the SCD file, and may be used as 
part of a C/C++ program. An example SCD file and a  file are also provided by 
the software package. (Blair 2012; Blair Booth & Burt 2011a; Blair, Coffele, Booth & 
Burt 2012). 
Transform
Instantiate
 
Figure 14. The code generation process. The EMF platform generates a Java model and 
an XML parser from the IEC 61850 XML Schema files, validates the SCD file used 
as an input, generates an instance of the Java model according to the structure in the 
SCD file, populates the instance with data from the SCD file, and finally transforms 
the Java objects into C code. (Adapted from Blair, Coffele, Booth & Burt 2012; 
Blair, Booth & Burt 2011b.) 
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Each data type in the SCD file is mapped to a C data structure, resulting in a hierarchy 
of C data structures. Primitive types, such as integer and floating-point numbers, are 
mapped to generic primitive types, which are then mapped to device-specific C 
primitive types of appropriate byte-length and sign. An example of the mapping of the 
common data class (Sampled Value) from SCL to C is given in Figure 15. (Blair, 
Coffele, Booth & Burt 2012.) 
 
Figure 15. The mapping of hierarchical SCL data types creates C data structures with 
the same hierarchy in the resulting code. (Adapted from Blair, Coffele, Booth & 
Burt 2012.) 
The software is intended to be platform-independent and lightweight enough to run on 
embedded devices, and therefore only GOOSE and SV messaging are implemented. 
The architecture may be extended in the future to support other features of IEC 61850, 
like the MMS services. (Blair, Booth & Burt 2011a.)  
The configuration process required to set up the  platform is rather 
complicated. The software setup was done by following the instructions in the 
 file found at (Blair 2012). 
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3.2. The Vampset IED Configuration Tool 
Vampset is an IED Configuration Tool provided by Vamp Ltd. for configuring Vamp 
IEDs. In order to configure an IED in Vampset, the IED must first be connected to the 
PC through an Ethernet network or USB. After that the connection is established, the 
ICD file residing in the IED is automatically downloaded to Vampset—this procedure is 
often referred to as “self-description” of a device in IEC 61850. 
The IEC 61850 server interface of Vamp supports (VAMP 2009: 1): 
 a configurable data model—selection of logical nodes corresponding to active 
application functions, 
 configurable pre-defined DataSets, 
 dynamic DataSets created by clients, 
 reporting functions with buffered and unbuffered report control blocks, 
 a control model; direct with normal security, 
 configurable GOOSE publisher DataSets, and  
 configurable filters for GOOSE subscriber inputs. 
A Vamp IED receiving GOOSE messages can map the binary values of the message to 
its 64 input points, i.e., network inputs NI1 to NI64.  Vamp IEDs can transmit GOOSE 
messages which consist of a maximum of 8 Boolean data attribute values. Two GOOSE 
control blocks ( and ) are available for controlling the transmission of 
GOOSE messages—the maximum number of data points in one device is therefore 16. 
(VAMP 2009: 5.)  
The following figures reflect the configurations done in Vampset to enable the Vamp 
IED to transmit and receive GOOSE messages. The configuration process was initiated 
by resetting all the current settings—all report control blocks were disabled, whereas the 
GCB1 and GOOSE subscription were enabled. The GOOSE configuration view in 
Vampset is illustrated in Figure 16. Different  must be used for  
and , and for every IED communicating with the device. Vamp IEDs can receive 
GOOSE messages only via one , therefore all devices transmitting data 
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to the Vamp IED must have the same  set in their GOOSE control 
blocks. The different sources are distinguished by their unique . 
(VAMP 2010a: 6; VAMP 2010b: 3.) 
Main configurations to enable 
sending of an 8-bit GOOSE 
data packet.
Configuration Revision 
number, which may be used to 
block usage of wrong data in 
the GOOSE data receiver.
MAC Address for GOOSE data, 
allowed range 01-0C-CD-01-00-00 
… 01-0C-CD-01-01-FF
Application ID 
This is a number which identifies the 
GOOSE data packet and is used in 
the receiver to receive correct data 
package.
Main configurations to enable 
reception of GOOSE data 
from other devices.
MAC address for incoming GOOSE 
data. The Vamp IED can only receive 
GOOSE packets over this multicast 
address.
 
Figure 16. The GOOSE configuration view in Vampset shows the main parameters for 
configuring the GOOSE publisher and subscriber functions. (Screenshot from 
Vampset.) 
The logical nodes (functions) which are to be used via the IEC 61850 interface are 
selected in the IEC 61850 data map view, as illustrated in Figure 17. Virtual inputs 1 
and 2, which correspond to the F1 and F2 buttons on the front panel of Vamp 50, were 
set . The virtual inputs 1 and 2 are data attributes residing in the logical nodes 
 and , respectively.  The user can also select which logical 
nodes shall relate to the three available report control block . Some clients 
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may create their own so called dynamic data sets and assign these to report control 
blocks. Both persistent and non-persistent DataSets are supported. The meaning of 
“persistent” and “non-persistent” is explained in Section 4.7, ‘The DataSet class’. 
(VAMP 2009: 3-4.) 
Predefined IEC 61850 
names for the functions
Select, which data set(s) are used 
to send events from the function
Editable text for 
the functions
Select, which 
functions are in use  
Figure 17. The IEC 61850 data map view shows the logical nodes (functions) which 
are used and whose data attributes can be included in  for reporting 
functions. (Screenshot from Vampset.) 
The data attributes of the logical nodes set  in the IEC 61850 data map view can 
now be included in a GOOSE , governed by  or , as illustrated in 
Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18. The GOOSE . The user can select up to eight Boolean data 
attributes to be sent as a GOOSE message. (Screenshot from Vampset.)  
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The GOOSE messages that the IED shall subscribe to are selected in the Subscriber data 
configuration window, illustrated in Figure 19. The  of the IED to receive 
GOOSE messages from must be set, along with the  of the desired data 
attribute in the GOOSE packet. The application being developed needed to receive only 
one single data attribute. 
 
Figure 19. The GOOSE subscriber data configuration view. The IED is configured to 
receive a GOOSE message with , and to map the data attribute at 
 in the message internally to Network Input 1. (Screenshot from 
Vampset.) 
After that any configurations have been done in Vampset the IED must be updated by 
uploading the new configurations to it. Vampset can export the ICD file, which can 
subsequently be opened in a System Configuration Tool or in an XML editor. More 
information on Vampset can be found in the documents at Vamp’s website19. 
3.3. Development of the SCD file 
The system configuration began by taking the SCD file  provided by 
 and stripping it of everything unnecessary: everything but the header 
section, an IED section, and the communications and data type templates sections 
belonging to that IED was removed. Then, by using the IED and its communication and 
data type templates as a framework, a new IED named  was created. No System 
Configuration Tool was used in this project; the SCD file was edited manually in an 
                                                          
19
 http://www2.schneider-electric.com/sites/corporate/en/products-services/former-
brands/vamp/vamp.page 
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XML editor. Section 3.3.1 explains how IED  was derived. Section 3.3.2 
explains how IED , generated by Vampset, was added to the SCD file. 
3.3.1. IED Laptop 
IED  was assigned the logical node , which represents reciprocating 
engine characteristics, measured values, and controls, as outlined by IEC 61850-7-420 
and given in Table 1. The first letter (D) in the logical node name is the group indicator, 
indicating that  belongs to a group of logical nodes defined for the DER domain. 
Only the mandatory (M) data object in the  class, , was used. 
 can acquire the Boolean values of or , and is derived from the 
common data class . Common data classes (CDCs) are explained in more detail in 
Section 4.6, ‘Data object classes’. (IEC 61850-7-420 2009: 56; IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 
18.) 
Table 1. Portion of the class definition for the logical node class . The data 
object , derived from CDC , can acquire the Boolean values  
or , and is mandatory in an instance of the  class. (IEC 61850-7-420 
2009: 57.)  
 
 stands for Single Point Status and can be found in IEC 61850-7-3. The  class 
is given in Table 2. Three data attributes are mandatory in an instance of the  class: 
, which can acquire Boolean values,  (quality), and  (timestamp).  was 
used, i.e., referenced by a DataSet.  has the trigger option ()  (data 
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change), which means that when has a data value change from false-to-true or 
true-to-false, the value of  is sent as a GOOSE message to another IED that 
references , i.e., IED . All three data attributes have a functional constraint 
() meaning that they are functionally constrained data attributes (FCDAs).  
Table 2. Portion of the class definition for the CDC Single Point Status (). Three 
data attributes are mandatory when a data object is instantiated from the class: 
, , and . (IEC 61850-7-3 2010: 26.) 
 
The functional constraint indicates the services that are allowed to be operated on a 
specific data attribute:  =  (status information) indicates that the status 
information values may be read, substituted, reported or logged, but not written (by 
services), as given in Table 3. The data attributes of a CDC are also grouped by FCs 
into categories. The functional constraints can be found in IEC 61850-7-2. (Mackiewicz 
2006.) 
Table 3. The definition of the value . (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 54.) 
 
The data type templates derived for , , and  were given in 
the end of Section 2.6.3, ‘Structure of the SCL file’. 
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3.3.2. IED VAMP 
The ICD file, describing the complete configuration of Vamp 50, was opened in an 
XML editor. A reference to the data attribute  of DataSet  in IED  
was added, after which the updated ICD file was re-opened in Vampset and used to 
update Vamp 50. The information in the ICD file was then copied over to the SCD file. 
The addition of the VAMP IED to the SCD file demanded significant modifications to 
the SCL code due to the compatibility issues discovered when  parsed the 
file. The main problem was caused by the fact that  uses a newer 
namespace (2006) while Vamp uses an older one (2003). To solve the problem, the old 
namespaces were removed, as were incompatible parts of the data type templates 
section. Unused report control blocks and GOOSE network inputs were removed for 
convenience. The resulting SCD file that was finally accepted by the  
parser no longer entirely conformed to the IEC 61850-6 standard due to the removed 
information. The modified SCD file was also not used to update the Vamp IED. 
However, as the SCD file was only needed to generate the communications code for the 
LDU, the modifications had no impact on the result—what was most important was that 
the MAC addresses, Application IDs, DataSet references, and input references were 
configured correctly.  
3.4. The C source code 
The finished SCD file was used as an input to the  parser, which then 
generated some C source and header files. The provided  file and the example 
functions it contained were used as a framework when new functionalities were 
developed. Code for reading and writing Ethernet packets is however not provided by 
the software platform. The code had to be included manually, as will be explained next.  
3.4.1. Communication 
The  file recommends the  (packet capture) API (Application 
Programming Interface) for handling the communication. Packet capture refers to the 
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action of collecting data as it travels over a network.  Linux implements  in the 
 library, which can be used by programs to read and write data packets directly 
at the DataLink layer, independently of the actual DataLink access provided by the 
operating system. This is consistent with the mapping of GOOSE messages directly to 
Ethernet frames, bypassing the middle layers. (Garcia 2008; Wikipedia 2013; Stevens 
1998: 703, 708, 725.) 
The  library was not readily available in the LDU, and therefore a packet socket 
was created instead. In the general case, sockets represent interfaces from the upper 
three layers into the Transport layer. The use of sockets enables communication 
between applications on the same host or between applications on different hosts 
connected via a network (i.e., communication on two different ranges). A socket always 
exists within a communication domain, which determines the range of communication 
and the address format used to identify the socket. The most common socket types are 
stream sockets () and datagram sockets (), used 
with the Transport layer protocols TCP and UDP
20
, respectively. A socket of type raw 
() can be used to bypass the Transport layer and use the Network layer 
directly. (Stevens 1998: 18; Kerrisk 2010; 1150, 1162.) 
The function  creates a socket and 
returns a file descriptor used to refer to the newly created socket in later system calls. 
The domain argument specifies the domain for the socket, and the type argument 
specifies the socket type. The value of the protocol argument is in general 0. The 
address information of the socket is stored in a struct of type . The function 
call  
creates a packet socket. Packet sockets are used to send or receive packets at the 
DataLink layer, and can thus be used for GOOSE messaging. The code for the packet 
socket can be found in Appendix 3. (Kerrisk 2010: 1153; Ubuntu Manuals 2013.)  
                                                          
20
 User Datagram Protocol 
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The most important functions provided by  are the encoding and decoding 
functions for GOOSE and Sampled Values. GOOSE packets are generated by calling 
the function  where is a 
pointer to a reserved memory space where the bytes are to be stored,  
should be  if any value in the DataSet has changed, and  is the 
maximum time in milliseconds for the receiver to wait for the next retransmission. If 
this time is exceeded before a new message arrives, it is assumed that a communication 
failure has occurred. The function returns the length of the GOOSE packet. (Blair 2012; 
IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 93.)  
The transmission of GOOSE messages is controlled by a GOOSE Control Block. 
However, no trigger options are supported at present in . The most 
common trigger option is such that when the value of a data attribute referenced by a 
GOOSE DataSet changes, i.e., when an internal event has occurred, the message is 
transmitted. Therefore it is up to the user to create an event monitor that monitors the 
referenced data attributes. When a value changes, the  function is called and the 
 parameter is set to . Upon retransmission, the value is set to . (Blair 
2012; Blair 2013.) 
The function developed for retransmitting “old” GOOSE messages is given in Figure 
20. Transmission of a “new” message is done through a callback function as will be 
explained in Section 3.4.3. More details on Linux API functions can be found in 
(Stevens 1998) or the Ubuntu Manuals online.  
 
Figure 20. The functions for the encoding and sending of a GOOSE data packet. The 
encoding function is provided by  and the send function uses a packet 
socket. 
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The function for receiving a GOOSE packet is given in Figure 21. As long as there is 
data in the reception buffer, the packets are filtered by the multicast address range 
specified for GOOSE and Sampled Values in Annex B of IEC 61850-8-1. 
 
Figure 21. The functions used for receiving and filtering GOOSE messages. 
A framework for an optional callback function is provided. After a received GOOSE or 
Sampled Values message has been successfully decoded, the callback function is called. 
The actual functionality of the callback function is user defined. It can, for example, be 
used to save the received GOOSE data to a separate memory buffer—by default, only 
one packet of data is saved in the buffer for each GSE Control, and that packet is 
overwritten when a new packet arrives. (Blair 2012.) 
3.4.2. The GOOSE retransmission scheme 
The GOOSE retransmission scheme, specified in IEC 61850-8-1, is not available in 
 at present. Therefore, it had to be developed and added manually. The 
developed algorithm is experimental and was used for demonstration purposes only. It 
fulfils neither the functional requirements nor the performance requirements imposed by 
the GOOSE protocol. A real implementation that is utilizing GOOSE trip messages 
would also require a real-time operating system running on the target processor. 
The retransmission algorithm is given in Figure 22. At the first loop of the infinite 
loop, the value of  is 0 and the value of is also 0, which means 
that the statement is evaluated as true. As the value of  is less than 4, 
it is incremented by one. Next, a GOOSE packet containing the values of the data 
attributes referenced by DataSet  is generated. The packet is assigned the 
 value specified in the array  at the position 
determined by the value of  i.e., 1024 milliseconds. The GOOSE 
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packet is then sent over the network using the specified multicast address. To indicate 
that a package was sent, a message containing the  value is printed 
to console. The variable  is reset to 0 and the program sleeps for 500 milliseconds. 
The idea with the sleeping is to create the delays corresponding to the retransmission 
intervals of the GOOSE retransmission scheme, which is explained in more detail in 
Section 4.8. One loop corresponds to (approximately) a 0.5 second delay, four loops 
correspond to 4*500 ms = 2 seconds, 20 loops correspond to 10 seconds, and 20 loops 
correspond to the keep-alive
21
 interval of 20 seconds. 
Although the value of  was reset to 0, it is immediately incremented to 1 in the 
second loop by the update expression in the  loop. As the  statement is still 
evaluated as true, another message is transmitted. Variable  is again reset to 0 and 
the application sleeps for another 500 milliseconds. 
In the third loop, the  statement is no longer evaluated as true. Therefore no message is 
transmitted,  is not incremented, and  is not reset to 0. The  
statement is evaluated as false also in the fourth and fifth loops, and the application has 
thus “slept” for an interval of approximately 2 seconds. In the sixth loop, the value of 
 has grown to 4, meaning that the  statement is again evaluated as true, and 
another message is sent.  
The algorithm continues in this manner to increase the message sending intervals until 
the value of  reaches 4. At this point the retransmission interval is 20 
seconds, and the algorithm continues indefinitely at this rate. A detailed, step-by-step 
walkthrough of the algorithm can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
                                                          
21
 The keep-alive message is a retransmission of the latest GOOSE message, continuously 
transmitted between long time intervals, typically 20 seconds. It essentially informs other IEDs 
that “the sender is still alive”. See Section 4.8 or IEC 61850-8-1 for more details.  
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Figure 22. The GOOSE retransmission scheme implemented in The algorithm 
is based on a platform-specific  function which creates the delays between 
retransmissions of the same GOOSE message. One loop of the infinite  loop 
corresponds to a delay of approximately 0.5 seconds. The algorithm uses an array 
the values of which give the number of loops that should be performed between 
retransmissions to create the required delays. 
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3.4.3. The message exchange 
The application, running on the LDU, copies the binary value received in a GOOSE 
message from Vamp 50 over to data attribute  in logical node . That data 
attribute is referenced by DataSet , and is then sent back as a GOOSE message to 
Vamp 50. In other words, the application simply returns the received value to the 
sender.  
The application begins by retransmitting a GOOSE message, even before receiving a 
GOOSE message first, at the lowest retransmission time interval. When a GOOSE 
message is received and decoded, the GSEcallbackFunction is executed. The callback 
function is depicted in Figure 23. A message indicating that the F1 button on the front 
panel of Vamp 50 was pressed, along with the  value of the 
received message, is printed to console. If the received value was , the string indicates 
that the button is  and otherwise . 
The following  statement checks whether the received value is the same value that is 
stored in data attribute  in logical node  of IED . If the values are 
different, it means that an internal event has occurred in Vamp 50 (button F1 or F2 has 
been pressed), and the  statement evaluates as true. The old value in  is then 
overwritten with the received value.  and  are reset to 0 indicating 
that a new retransmission starting from the shortest retransmission interval should begin 
after that the application exits the callback function. A new GOOSE message with the 
shortest retransmission interval is then generated and sent over the network, and a 
message indicating that the message was sent is printed to console. 
If the received value equals the value stored in  in logical node , the 
received message is assumed to be a retransmission of an earlier internal event and will 
be ignored. A more sophisticated method would be to check the  parameter of a 
GOOSE message, which increments by one for each internal event. The parameter 
 is incremented by each retransmission of the same event. 
 55 
 
Figure 23. The GSE callback function. The function simply returns the value of a data 
attribute received in a new GOOSE message to the sender. 
3.4.4. Testing and results 
Results obtained from the PuTTY terminal are depicted in Figure 24. The figure shows 
how the LDU, at start-up, starts the retransmission with the shortest interval. The value 
of the  parameter for each message is printed out. The interval 
grows larger until the keep-alive interval is reached (20 seconds) with the value of the 
 parameter being 32768 milliseconds. Vamp 50 transmits its own 
messages at a keep-alive interval of 20 seconds. The value of the  
parameter for keep-alive messages being retransmitted at this rate is 40000 
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milliseconds
22
. The application does not measure the time elapsed between the received 
messages or check whether this time window is smaller than the  
value. As Figure 24 shows, the value of the data attribute , which relates to button 
, is initially  (). 
 
Figure 24. The message exchange between the LDU and Vamp 50, monitored by 
PuTTY. An internal event in Vamp 50 changes the value of button  to and 
the message is retransmitted multiple times. LDU receives the changed value and 
returns it in its own retransmissions. 
                                                          
22
 This means in practice that every second packet sent could be lost without this being noticed by 
the subscriber. The values are however adjustable. 
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After a few initial keep-alive retransmissions, the button  is pressed and Vamp 50 lets 
out a burst of rapid retransmissions. The retransmission intervals grow until the keep-
alive rate is achieved. The LDU replies to the first message received after that the button 
was pressed by sending out its own burst of rapid retransmissions.  
Figure 25 depicts the contents of the GOOSE messages of Vamp 50 and LDU, 
respectively, sent before (A) button  was pressed and after (B) button  was 
pressed. Between A and B, the Boolean data attribute
23
 value has changed from  
to  and the value of the parameter  has increased by one. The results show 
that the communication works, and the requirements have therefore been met. 
 
                                                          
23
 The DataSet of IED  actually contained two data attributes, but only one was used. 
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A
B
 
Figure 25. Contents of the GOOSE messages transmitted by Vamp 50 and the LDU, 
respectively. A = messages sent at the stable keep-alive retransmission rate. B = the 
first messages transmitted after button  was pressed. (Screenshots from 
Wireshark.) 
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4. THE ABSTRACT COMMUNICATION SERVICE INTERFACE 
The Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI) is a layered communication 
architecture that provides for systems in power utility automation a virtual model of the 
real devices and their data, i.e., a virtual interface to the analogue world. The virtual 
model is made visible and accessible through ACSI services, which are used to 
exchange the information represented by the data objects and their data attributes 
between different devices according to well-defined rules described in IEC 61850-5. 
(IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 11; IEC 61850-7-1: 16-18, 72-73.) 
The ACSI provides abstract definitions of 
 hierarchical information modelling classes, 
 services operating on instances of these classes, and  
 parameters associated with each service.  
The ACSI enables interoperability between different devices by abstracting away the 
underlying implementation details. The class models and services are thus independent 
of any specific protocol stacks, implementations, and operating systems. Realization of 
any concrete information exchange requires mapping of the abstract class models and 
services to a real protocol stack through Specific Communication Service Mappings 
(SCSMs). (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 11.)  
Due to the abstraction, only those aspects of a real substation device or a real function 
that are visible and accessible over a communication network are modelled, which leads 
to the hierarchical class models. Conversely, anything that is not modelled as a class of 
a service, logical device, logical node, data object, data attribute, control block, etc. is 
not visible to the network. The conceptual class model of the ACSI is a comprehensive 
model for how physical devices shall organize their data. The ACSI class model 
describing a real substation device is repeated for convenience in Figure 26. (IEC 
61850-7-2 2010: 11; IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 80; Mackiewicz 2006.) 
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LOGICAL DEVICE
LOGICAL DEVICE
LOGICAL DEVICE
...
LOGICAL DEVICE
LOGICAL NODE
LOGICAL NODE
LOGICAL NODE
...
LOGICAL NODE
DATA OBJECT
DATA OBJECT
DATA OBJECT
...
DATA OBJECT
DATA ATTRIBUTE
DATA ATTRIBUTE
DATA ATTRIBUTE
...
 
Figure 26. The conceptual class model of the ACSI. (Adapted from Liang & Campbell 
2008.) 
Each individual class model of the ACSI class model comprises a number of attributes 
and services. When a class is instantiated, it becomes an object. The services of the 
object can then be used by a client—mainly to write information to, or read information 
from the object using a client/server communication model. The attributes describe or 
characterize the externally visible features of an instance of a class. Typical class 
attributes are the object name and the object reference, which represent the name and 
path-name of an instance of the class, respectively. Object names and references are 
described in more detail in Section 4.3. Other attributes are the object classes that the 
class contains, for example logical nodes, data objects, data attributes, and control 
blocks. Most interactions with a physical device are through data objects and data 
attributes in logical nodes and services. (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 17, 40; IEC 61850-7-1 
2011: 54, 87; Liang & Campbell 2008.) 
The object classes defined by the class model are (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 14, 17, 45; IEC 
61850-7-1 2011: 14, 64.): 
 Server - represents the externally visible behaviour of a physical device. All 
other ACSI models are part of the server. 
 Logical device - mainly a composition of logical nodes and additional services. 
Represents the information produced and consumed by a group of typical 
domain-specific automation, protection or other application functions. 
 Logical node – represents the information produced and consumed by a single 
domain-specific automation, protection, or other application function. 
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 Data objects - represents domain specific information of applications located in 
a physical device, for example status or measurement. 
The service modelling classes of the ACSI provide services operating on instances of 
data objects, data attributes, DataSets, and other attributes that are contained in logical 
nodes. All services are requested by applications (clients) and responded by servers. The 
services and the response to those services are well defined, which enables all physical 
devices to behave in an identical manner seen from the network behaviour perspective. 
Due to the abstraction, only those aspects that are needed in describing the required 
actions on the receiving and sending side of a service request are defined. (IEC 61850-
7-2 2010: 18; IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 24, 31-32; Liang & Campbell 2008; Mackiewicz 
2006.)   
Many services may be used to remotely manage IEDs, e.g. to define DataSets, to set a 
reference to a specific value, or to enable sending specific reports by a report control 
block. (IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 32.) 
The service modelling classes are listed below (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 18.): 
 Application association – provides mechanisms for establishing and 
maintaining connections between devices. 
 DataSet – permits the grouping of data objects and data attributes. 
 Substitution – forces a specific data attribute to be set to a value independent of 
the process. 
 Setting group control – defines how to switch from one set of setting values to 
another one and how to edit setting groupings. 
 Control blocks for reports and logs – describes the conditions for generating 
reports and logs based on parameters set by configuration or by a client. 
 Control blocks for generic substation events – supports a fast and reliable 
system-wide distribution of GOOSE messages controlled by the GOOSE control 
block. 
 Control block for transmission of Sampled Values – fast and cyclic transfer 
of sampled data values. 
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 Control – describes the services to control. 
 Time and time synchronization – provides the time base for the device and 
system. 
 File system – defines the exchange of large data blocks. 
 Tracking – provides a diagnosis interface to track services. 
Control blocks are modelled similar to data classes, but there is a fundamental 
difference between instances of data classes and control blocks: objects are used to 
interface to application level functions, while control blocks configure the 
communication services. Control blocks have attributes that can be set to specific values 
through services or SCL files. The values of the attribute-set define the dynamic 
behaviour of the control block. All control block attributes can be read by other IEDs. 
(IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 35; IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 70.) 
The service parameters are not a part of a data model—they represent information 
conveyed by services between clients and servers. For example, a client may use the 
 service to retrieve a list of the names of all the logical devices 
contained in a Server object. The service parameters of the  service 
are given in Table 4. The parameter of the request contains an 
identification of the selected class. The selected class in this example is “logical-
device”. The parameter  indicates that the request was successful, and the 
server returns the parameter  containing the object references of the 
logical devices to the client. The parameter  indicates that the service 
request failed, and the server returns the parameter  containing an error 
message like “parameter-value-inappropriate” to the client. (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 31; 
IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 22.) 
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Table 4. Service parameters of the  service of the Server class. 
(IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 31.) 
 
IEC 61850 outlines two main groups of communication models: the client/server model 
and the publisher/subscriber (peer-to-peer) model. The client/server model is used for 
ACSI services, and the publisher/subscriber model is used for communication services 
such as GOOSE and Sampled Values. The two communication methods are depicted in 
Figure 27. (Ozansoy 2006: 120-121.) 
 
Figure 27. Two groups of ACSI communication methods: one group uses a 
client/server model with services like control or get data values. The second group 
uses a peer-to-peer model with GSE (GOOSE) services and Sampled Value 
services. (IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 70-71.) 
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Some of the classes used for information modelling are presented in the following 
sections. The more advanced aspects of data modelling, for example the SubDataObject 
classes and the SubDataAttribute classes with their recursive properties are beyond the 
scope of this thesis and therefore omitted. 
4.1. The application association model 
The application association model is used to establish communication between devices, 
i.e., a conveyance path between a client and a server for the exchange of messages. The 
conceptual model comprises both class definitions of application associations, two-party 
and multicast, and access control concepts—a mechanism for controlling the access to 
the instances of a device. (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 32; IEC 61850-2 2003: 5.) 
An application (client) must first establish a valid two-party application association 
(TPAA) with a server before it can request a service. The TPAA class provides a bi-
directional connection-oriented information exchange by conveying service requests 
and responses, both confirmed and unconfirmed services, between client and server, as 
illustrated in Figure 28. The  thus provides a virtual view of the server to the 
application, and this view defines the visibility of objects in the server from the 
application point of view. It also defines what kinds of services of those objects are 
accessible from the application. (Liang & Campbell 2008; 61850-7-2 2010: 32.) 
The multicast application association (MCAA) class conveys unidirectional, 
unconfirmed messages (in one direction only) between one source (publisher) and one 
or many destinations (subscribers). Examples of MCAAs are GOOSE and SV 
messages. The MCAA ceases to exist as soon as the service has been processed. (IEC 
61850-7-2 2010: 32, 37.) 
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Figure 28. Operational principles of the two-party () and multicast application 
associations (). The  is used to establish a connection oriented 
association between client and server. The  is used to establish a 
connectionless association between publisher and subscriber(s). (IEC 61850-7-2 
2010: 33, 37.) 
A typical interaction between client (application) and server in TPAA (depicted on the 
left side of Figure 28) as presented in (Liang & Campbell 2008) proceeds as follows:  
1. The client establishes a TCP connection with the server. 
2. The client “logs in” to the server by requesting an appropriate service and by 
providing authentication related information as parameters. 
3. The server validates the information provided by the client and creates a TPAA 
object, which provides a virtual view of the server to the client. 
4. The client requests subsequent services while the server processes the requests 
and responses with appropriate responses defined in the IEC 61850 standard. 
5. The client issues a release request to the server. 
6. The server reclaims the TPAA of the application and ends the session. 
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4.2. Mapping of an abstract interface to a concrete interface 
The abstract class models and service models of the ACSI become usable only when 
mapped to a concrete “on-the-wire” transport protocol. This is done through a Specific 
Communication Service Mapping (SCSM). (Ozansoy 2006: 37.) 
The development in communication technology progresses faster than the development 
of the functionalities in substation automation. This means that the currently used 
protocol stack might get replaced by a new state-of-the-art protocol stack in the near 
future. To accommodate this change, the abstract class models and service models of 
the ACSI were designed to be independent from any particular protocol stack. The 
capability of the ACSI to adapt to different protocol stacks, without having to make any 
changes to the information models or databases, is usually seen as a significant 
advantage of IEC 61850. (De Mesmaeker, Rietmann, Brand & Reinhardt 2005; 
Mohagheghi, Tournier, Stoupis, Guise, Coste, Andersen, & Dall 2011; Ozansoy 2006: 
3.) 
The mapping process involves the implementation of the standard’s object models by 
using the existing models of an underlying communication service. The concrete 
information exchange, i.e. the specific format, encoding and transmission of the 
messages that carry the service parameters of a service is defined in the SCSM. IEC 
61850-8-1 specifies two different SCSMs for the object models and services of the 
ACSI (IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 24; Ozansoy 2006: 37; IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 14):  
 mapping of the object models and service models to the Manufacturing Message 
Specification (MMS) protocol that operates over the TCP/IP and Ethernet 
stacks, and 
 direct mapping of GOOSE messages onto Ethernet frames at the DataLink layer. 
An implementation that conforms to a specific communication profile implements the 
application association model required for that profile. The relations between the 
application associations specified in IEC 61850-7-2 and the communication profiles 
specified in IEC 61850-8-1 are listed in Table 5.  
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Table 5. Communication profiles and the application association models that are 
supported. (IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 58.) 
 
The  communication profile maps the ACSI TPAA model to the MMS 
protocol, as shown in Figure 29. This mapping defines how the concepts, objects and 
services of the ACSI are implemented using MMS concepts, objects and services. The 
TCP protocol is used for connection-oriented communication, which guarantees the 
message delivery. An introduction to the MMS protocol and the SCSM to MMS can be 
found in Appendix 5.  
 
IEC 61850-8-1
 
Figure 29. The abstract models of the ACSI need to be mapped to a concrete protocol 
stack through an SCSM. The data models and service models are mapped to the 
Application layer Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) protocol which 
operates over TCP/IP and Ethernet. GOOSE messages are mapped directly onto 
Ethernet frames on the DataLink layer.  (Adapted from IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 25.) 
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The GOOSE communication profile maps the ACSI MCAA model directly onto 
Ethernet frames on the DataLink layer. The direct mapping avoids any delays caused by 
the execution of middle layers in the protocol stack, making the GOOSE protocol 
suitable for time-critical data transfer. The drawback of connectionless communication 
is that the message delivery is not guaranteed—the publisher does not know which IEDs 
will receive the message, and the receiving IEDs will not acknowledge the successful 
reception of a message. The subscribing IEDs must cope with message loss, message 
duplication, messages delivered out-of-order and the loss of connectivity. In other 
words, connectionless multicast communication is unreliable. The SCSM for GOOSE is 
described in Section 4.8. (Xyngi & Popov 2010; Hou & Dolezilek 2008; IEC 61850-8-1 
2011: 14, 58.) 
The application and transport profile layers used in the SCSMs for MMS and GOOSE 
can be found in Appendix 1. 
4.3. Object names and references 
IEC 61850 differentiates between object names and object references. An object name 
(class instance name) identifies an instance of a class at one particular hierarchy level. 
An object reference (semantic) is constructed from the full path-name of the object. For 
example, the names of the logical device, logical node, data object, and data attribute 
are concatenated into a full path-name that identifies the instance of a data attribute 
uniquely. The example is illustrated in Figure 30.  A logical node name always contains 
an instance number as a suffix (e.g. ), and may also contain a prefix (e.g. ). (IEC 
61850-7-1 2011: 52, 93; IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 24.) 
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Figure 30. An example of object names and references. The figure shows the complete 
object reference (data attribute reference) to data attribute . (IEC 61850-7-1 
2011: 93.) 
The logical device names are not specified by the standard, but they have to be unique 
in a particular subnetwork. Data object names and data attribute names, from IEC 
61850-7-4 and IEC 61850-7-3 respectively, shall be used unchanged: a collection of 
standardized, abbreviated data object names for substation functions and equipment can 
be found in IEC 61850-7-4, and the semantics of all data attribute names can be found 
at the end of IEC 61850-7-3. The semantics of the service models with their attributes 
and the semantics of the services that operate on these attributes, including the 
parameters that are carried with the service requests and responses, are defined in IEC 
61850-7-2. (IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 22, 24, 52, 93-94; Mohagheghi, Tournier, Stoupis, 
Guise, Coste, Andersen & Dall 2011; Mackiewicz 2006.) 
4.4. The server class model 
A physical device may contain zero or more servers, usually one. The server has two 
roles: to communicate with a client and to send information to peer devices. Clients 
issue service requests and receive confirmations of the service that has been processed 
in the server. All service requests and responses are communicated by the protocol stack 
that is being used by a specific SCSM. A server is instantiated from the 
 70 
 and has a service access point24 (SAP) attribute, through which the 
logical device(s) of the physical device connects to a subnetwork. An SAP can be 
described as a logical representation of a network interface card, and it can be used 
without a server. The client logical nodes of any logical device can access a subnetwork 
through a SAP. Each server contains one or more logical devices with logical nodes. 
These logical nodes can, as server logical nodes, be accessed by a client logical node 
through a SAP. The client/server roles and the SAP are illustrated in Figure 31. 
Logical nodes can play the role of clients or servers, or both at the same time. As an 
example, a switch controller logical node (CSWI) may receive data as a client from a 
process bus, and provide data as a server to the station bus. (Ozansoy 2006: 88, 94; IEC 
61850-7-2 2010: 17, 29; IEC 61850-2 2003: 5; Liang & Campbell 2008; IEC 61850-7-1 
2011: 76-77; IEC 61850-6 2009: 24, 57.) 
 
Figure 31. Client/server and logical nodes. Client logical nodes in a logical device in 
one IED may access the server logical nodes in a logical device belonging to a 
server in another IED through the server’s SAP. The logical nodes residing in any 
logical device in the IED may, as clients, access the subnetwork through a SAP. 
(IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 77.)   
                                                          
24
 Each server has only one, logical, access point. Each access point of an IED to a communication 
bus is uniquely defined. (IEC 61850-2 2003: 5.) 
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The SAP is generally an abstraction of an IP address and identifies the server within the 
scope of a subnetwork. It is a logical construct through which a peer selects a 
communication protocol or access to an application. The SAP is required by most 
services to address the server. As an example, at least one SAP needs to be supported 
for GOOSE services, where the SAP is defined as the combination of the physical MAC 
address, Ethertype, and Application ID specified by the profile for GOOSE. 
Implementations that use the client/server profile shall support at least one 
PresentationAddress (Presentation layer address) that makes use of the TCP/IP T-
Profile. The type of the SAP thus depends on the SCSM used for the service—the SAP 
is a profile
25
 of the underlying SCSM. (IEC 61850-2 2003: 22; IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 
29-30; Ozansoy 2006: 92; IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 56.) 
The SAPs (communication addresses/interfaces) of a subnetwork are used for building 
application associations between logical nodes. Client logical nodes need to connect to a 
SAP prior to establishing a TPAA with the server’s logical nodes, and subscriber logical 
nodes need to establish an MCAA with publisher’s logical nodes. Logical nodes are the 
only objects in IEC 61850 that communicate with each other. (IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 77; 
Liang & Campbell 2008; IEC 61850-6 2009: 24-25.)  
Logical nodes may as clients use all SAPs of a physical device to access logical nodes 
on other physical devices. An SAP needs to have a server if the physical device needs to 
be supervised remotely, as the  and  of the server’s logical device are used 
to supervise and control the physical device. A physical device can manage without a 
server if all its logical nodes use an SAP as clients only and no remote supervision is 
required. (IEC 61850-6 2009: 24, 57.) 
 
Although only one service, the , is specified in the 
 definition, several  and  services 
                                                          
25
 The selection of the entire seven layers of a service access point represents a communication 
profile. (IEC 61850-2 2003: 22.) 
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are specified in IEC 61850-7-2 to support the self-description of a device.  A client may 
use these services to make inquiries regarding the names and definitions of the objects 
that the server contains, i.e., the client can retrieve the definition of the complete 
hierarchy and the definition of all accessible information of all instances of all 
underlying classes in a given server. The operation of these services is illustrated in 
Figure 32. (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 29-31.) 
 
Figure 32. The requests and responses of the  and  
services of the server. These services are used by clients to retrieve the object 
names, references, and definitions, or the complete self-description of a given 
device. (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 30.) 
4.5. The logical node class model 
Logical nodes for common applications are instantiated from compatible logical node 
classes, defined in IEC 61850-7-4. For example, the compatible logical node class 
 represents common information of a real circuit breaker, and this class can be 
reused for circuit breakers of various brands and types. The compatible logical node 
classes are application-specific specializations of the basic , 
defined in IEC 61850-7-2, from which they inherit their structure and all definitions. 
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The relationships between different logical nodes are shown in Figure 33. The common 
logical node class provides data objects which are mandatory or conditional to all 
compatible logical node classes. (IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 28, 91; IEC 61850-7-4 2010 21-
22.)  
GenLogicalNodeClass
Common logical node
LPHD LLN0Compatible logical node
IEC 61850-7-2
IEC 61850-7-4
 
Figure 33. Logical node relationships. The  and the common logical node are 
independent of the application domain. All other logical nodes are domain-specific 
and inherit at least the mandatory data objects of the common logical node class. 
The common logical node itself is never instantiated.  (Adapted from IEC 61850-7-
4 2010: 21.) 
A logical node groups several data object classes to build up a specific functionality. 
For example,  contains over 15 data object classes that represent meaningful 
information of the application. Most of the information defined in a logical node is 
therefore described by the data object classes it consists of. (IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 28, 
80.) 
All logical nodes have a specific name and reference attribute, and one or more data 
object classes. The data object classes in a compatible logical node are given by the 
common logical node. All logical nodes may additionally contain zero or more of the 
following classes (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 40):  
 74 
 Buffered Report Control Block, 
 Unbuffered Report Control Block, and  
 DataSet. 
Compatible logical nodes may also support zero or more of the following classes:  
 GOOSE Control Block,  
 Setting Group Control Block, 
 Multicast Sampled Value Control Block,  
 Unicast Sampled Value Control Block,  
 LOG, and 
 Log Control Block.  
The and  are two special infrastructure logical nodes. The  is used 
for accessing hardware related data of an IED. It represents the common data of the 
physical device hosting the logical device, and contains three mandatory data objects:  
  represents the physical device name plate,  
  represents the physical device health, and  
  is used as an indication of whether the logical node is used as a proxy.  
The is used for accessing logical device related data of an IED. A lot of 
information required for device management is modelled in IEC 61850-7-4 as data 
object classes in  (Ozansoy 2006: 43; IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 64, 80; IEC 61850-7-
4 2010: 22.) 
4.6. Data object classes 
Data objects are instantiated from the basic , which was earlier 
referred to as  class in the first edition of IEC 61850-7-2. However, which data 
attributes that  should contain is not specified. (IEC 61850-7-1 
2011: 80; Liang & Campbell 2008.) 
 75 
A data object is basically a container consisting of a set of data attributes which relate to 
the same application. Data objects thus facilitate the managing and exchange of the 
values of the data attributes of a particular application. The data attribute classes that are 
shared by many data object classes for the most common applications have been 
grouped together for convenience. These data attribute classes, common to many data 
object classes, are called common data classes (CDCs). The CDC is thus a refinement 
of the , to which the previously missing data attributes have been 
added. The core CDCs are classified into the following groups: 
 status information, 
 measuring information, 
 controllable status information, 
 controllable analogue information, 
 status settings, 
 analogue settings, and 
 description information. 
A data object is instantiated from the , to which the data 
attributes of a particular CDC has been assigned. The data attributes that the data object 
instance contains are thus instances of the data attribute classes of the CDC. The chosen 
CDC describes the type and structure of the instantiated data object, i.e., the data object 
is typed by the CDC, the type being defined by the functionality of the data attributes. 
Data objects that are typed by a specific CDC (i.e., have been assigned application-
specific data attributes) are referred to as compatible data objects. Many compatible 
data objects for a wide range of well-known applications are defined in IEC 61850-7-4 
and IEC 61850-7-3, where they are assigned suitable application specific names. The 
compatible data objects do not usually implement all the data attribute classes of their 
CDC—they are thus specialized (further refined) CDCs that often inherit only the data 
attributes which are required (mandatory) for instantiation. The refinement of the 
 to a CDC, and further refinement of the CDC to a compatible 
data object class is illustrated in Figure 34. (Liang & Campbell 2008; Mackiewicz 2006; 
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IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 23, 28, 30, 80-82, 87; IEC 61850-7-4 2010: 10; IEC 61850 7-2 
2010: 45, 51.) 
 
Figure 34. Refinement of the  (referred to as  class in the 
figure) to a CDC, and further refinement of the CDC to a compatible data object 
class with defined data attributes and attribute values. (IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 80.) 
As an example, illustrated in Figure 35, the logical node  is instantiated from 
the compatible logical node class  which comprises multiple compatible data 
object classes (e.g. ) each refined from a CDC (e.g. ), where the whole set of 
all data attributes (e.g. ,  and ) inherited by a compatible data object class is (a 
subset of) a CDC. As a compatible data object class usually only implements a subset of 
the data attributes (i.e., the mandatory data attributes) of a CDC, the Type attribute of 
the compatible data object class is assigned a name (value) with an arbitrary prefix in 
front of the CDC name, for example . (IEC 61850-7-4 2010: 105-106.) 
 77 
 
Figure 35. Abstract data model example. The logical node  is instantiated 
from compatible logical node class . The compatible data object  is 
refined from common data class . The data attribute has a type and value 
determined by the CDC it is inherited from.  (IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 87.) 
Each CDC has services assigned to it that define the possible services that are allowed 
to be operated on the data attributes. The functional constraint (FC) is a property of a 
data attribute that indicates the services for example read value, write value, substitute 
value, etc. that may be applied to that data attribute. The data attributes of a CDC are 
also grouped into categories by their FCs. (Mackiewicz 2006; IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 54; 
IEC 61850-2 2003: 11.) 
4.6.1. The functional constraint 
 
The functional constraint (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 53; IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 89; Liang & 
Campbell 2008): 
 characterizes the specific use of a data attribute, 
 functionally restricts data attributes; groups all the data attributes by functions 
instead of grouping them by data objects,  
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 can be seen as a filter of the data attributes,  
 indicates which services can be used to access the values of the data attributes, 
 is used in the definition of data objects, and 
 is a property of the  model.  
The functional constraint values are defined in IEC 61850-7-2 along with the allowed 
services. The FCs are as follows (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 54): 
 ST – Status information 
 MX – Measurands (analogue values) 
 SP – Setting (outside setting group) 
 SV – Substitution 
 CF – Configuration 
 DC – Description 
 SG – Setting group 
 SE – Setting group editable 
 SR – Service response 
 OR – Operate received 
 BL – Blocking 
 EX – Extended definition (application name space) 
 XX – Representing all data attributes as a service parameter 
Functional Constrained Data (FCD) is a reference to an ordered collection of data 
attributes having the same FC value. These data attributes all reside in a same data 
object. The data attributes of the FCD are arranged in the same order as they appear in 
the data object. A Functional Constrained Data Attribute (FCDA) is a reference to a 
single SubDataObject, data attribute, or SubDataAttribute having a specific FC value. 
FCDs and FCDAs are used, for example, in remotely created DataSets. (IEC 61850-7-2 
2010: 53, 55.) 
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4.7. The DataSet class 
The reporting and logging functions as well as the SV and GOOSE messaging functions 
utilize DataSets for their spontaneous data transmission. The object references (FCDs 
and FCDAs) of functionally constrained data objects, SubDataObjects, data attributes, 
and SubDataAttributes can be grouped into a DataSet. The DataSet is thus an ordered 
collection of FCDs and FCDAs. The object references that the DataSet contains are 
called the members of the DataSet, and can reference any objects on the same server 
where the DataSet itself is defined. The functionally constrained objects in a server may 
be referenced by one or more DataSets. 
DataSets that are referenced by a control block must reside in the same logical node as 
the control block itself. This means that all GOOSE and SV data flow definitions must 
reside in the . When a GOOSE control block needs to transmit a message, the 
name of the referenced DataSet and the values of the objects referenced by that DataSet 
are encoded into a GOOSE message. The references themselves are normally not 
included in the message—from this follows that the members of the DataSet as well as 
the order these members appear in must be known by both the publisher and the 
subscriber(s). The client or subscriber(s) may later retrieve the object references out of 
the DataSet definition. (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 61, 63; IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 43; IEC 
61850-6 2009: 26.) 
DataSets may be created or configured through the  service and the 
members of a DataSet and their order can be retrieved by the  
service. A DataSet instance may be persistent or non-persistent, which relates to the 
visibility and sustainability of the DataSets. A persistent DataSet, or preconfigured 
DataSet, is visible to clients of any TPAA, and is not deleted when the TPAA over 
which it is created is released. A persistent DataSet can be referenced by any control 
block class, for example the GOOSE control block. A non-persistent DataSet is visible 
only to the client that created the instance, and is automatically deleted when the TPAA 
which it is created over is released. A non-persistent DataSet can be referenced only by 
an unbuffered report control block or a unicast sampled value control block. (IEC 
61850-7-2 2010: 61-62.) 
 80 
A control block that references a specific DataSet monitors the objects that the DataSet 
references. An internal event is created when a value change, according to some trigger 
condition specified by the attribute , occurs in any of the monitored objects. The 
internal events are used to trigger reporting, logging, transmission of SV messages, and 
transmission of GOOSE messages. As an example, in Figure 36, the DataSet 
resides in the  of the logical device . This DataSet has two 
members—the references to the data objects  () and  
(). A change in the value of the data attribute of data 
object  will be detected by an event monitor and cause the inclusion of the values of 
all data attributes of  in a message or log. (IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 40; IEC 61850-7-2 
2010: 55.) 
 
Figure 36. Example of a DataSet referenced by a control block. A value change in a 
data attribute of a data object referenced by the DataSet will be detected by an 
event monitor and cause a message to be generated and sent. (IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 
41.) 
In case of binary values, a false-to-true or true-to-false transition of the value of a data 
attribute referenced by a DataSet is detected by the event monitor. In case of analogue 
values, the event monitor may detect that the value of a data attribute deviates from a 
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specified deadband, or that the value crosses a specified range limit. The timestamp of a 
message is determined when an internal event occurs. It allows the subscribers to know 
that a status has changed and also the time of the last status change.  (IEC 61850-7-1 
2011: 37-39; IEC 61850-8-1 2010: 132.) 
GOOSE messages are also sent with quality attributes that the subscribers can interpret. 
The quality attributes are used to mark invalid data and to detect failures in IEDs. As an 
example, if an IED sending GOOSE data has an oscillating input, the data from this 
input is marked as oscillating and the subscribing IEDs will not update the application 
due to invalid data. Instead of using the invalid data, a subscriber will use a 
preconfigured fail-safe value. (Hakala-Ranta, Rintamäki & Starck 2009.) 
4.8. The generic substation event class model 
The generic substation event (GSE) class model applies to the exchange of the values of 
a collection of objects referenced by a DataSet. It provides an efficient method for 
system-wide delivery of event information through the use of multicast services. The 
information exchange is based on a publisher/subscriber mechanism. (IEC 61850-7-2 
2010: 131-133.) 
An overview of the classes and services of the GOOSE communication model is given 
in Figure 37. The conceptual operation of GOOSE goes as follows: when the event 
monitor detects an internal event, the values of the objects which are referenced by the 
DataSet are written into the local transmission buffer and sent over the network. The 
subscribers can then read the received values from their reception buffers. (IEC 61850-
7-2 2010: 131-132.) 
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Figure 37. Conceptual GOOSE communication model. The members of the DataSet 
are assigned numbers, the s. When an internal event occurs, the 
values that the DataSet references are written into a local transmission buffer and 
transmitted over the network. The subscriber(s) may then retrieve the received 
values from the reception buffer. (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 131.) 
A GOOSE control block (GoCB) class is used to control the transmission of GOOSE 
messages. The SCSM for the GSE model maps the GoCB to the MMS GoCB. The 
services of the GoCB class are as follows (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 131, 134-139; IEC 
61850-8-1 2011: 87.): 
 – service used by the GoCB to send a GOOSE 
message. 
  – service used by a client to retrieve specific members of the 
DataSet. 
 – service used by a client to retrieve the position 
of a selected member in the DataSet. 
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  – service used by a client to retrieve the attribute values of 
the GoCB. 
 – service used by a client to set the attribute values of the 
GoCB. 
An implementation declaring support for the , 
, and  must use the GSE management 
and GOOSE communication profile, given in Appendix 1. (IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 29.) 
When the GoCB needs to transmit a message, it uses the SendGOOSEMessage service. 
The SCSM for GOOSE messages encodes the values stored in the transmission buffer 
along with the name of the DataSet into a GOOSE message using the Abstract Syntax 
Notation One (ASN.1) Basic Encoding Rules (BER). SCSM-specific services
26
 of the 
communication network are responsible to update the local reception buffers of the 
subscribers. The subscribers can then decode and read the received values from their 
reception buffers. (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 131-132, 134; IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 93, 138.) 
The SCSM used for GOOSE messages utilizes a retransmission scheme to achieve a 
sufficient level of reliability for the connectionless communication. This is illustrated in 
Figure 38. When an internal event occurs, a GOOSE message is immediately 
transmitted. The same message is then retransmitted repeatedly within the shortest 
retransmission time . After the first few rapid retransmissions, the retransmission 
time intervals increases gradually to  and  before finally settling at , the stable 
retransmission time interval. The retransmission continues at this rate until a new event 
occurs that sets the interval back to , and another burst of messages is transmitted. 
The retransmission scheme should be managed by a state machine that the publisher 
creates and maintains. The time delays between the retransmissions, the exact number 
of different retransmission intervals, and the total number intervals having a specific 
delay are not specified in the standard. (IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 93-94; Hou & Dolezilek 
2008.) 
                                                          
26
 Defined by the Ethernet stack. 
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Figure 38. Retransmission intervals for the GOOSE message. When an internal event 
occurs, the GOOSE message is transmitted repeatedly between increasing time 
intervals, until finally settling at a stable time interval. (IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 93.) 
The periodically retransmitted message under stable conditions can be seen as a “keep-
alive” message. Each GOOSE message carries a user-specified  
parameter that informs the subscriber of the maximum time to wait for the next 
retransmission. If the  is exceeded before a new message is 
received, the subscriber assumes that the association is lost—this is used to detect a 
failure of the publisher or a failure of the link between publisher and subscriber. (Wester 
& Adamiak 2012; IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 93.) 
A device that is powered up sends information about its status as a GOOSE message. 
Any status changes are reported so that the receiving devices have knowledge of the 
time of the last status change. This knowledge allows devices to set local timers related 
to the event that caused the status change. All devices continue to resend their GOOSE 
messages over a long time cycle (the keep-alive interval) regardless of whether a status 
change has occurred or not, which ensures that the recently powered-up devices knows 
the status of their peer devices. (IEC 61850-7-2 2010: 132.) 
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The recommended multicast ranges for GOOSE and Sampled Values are given in Table 
6. A multicast address is a 6 octet string. An un-configured multicast address has the 
value 00 for every octet. (IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 143.) 
Table 6. Recommended multicast addresses for GOOSE, GSSE, and sampled values. 
(IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 143.) 
 
Although switches perform multicast filtering and utilize VLANs, an IED still has to 
decode a received GOOSE message to see if it is a subscriber to that particular message. 
In order to achieve a sufficient rate of filtering and to prevent flooding of the IEDs that 
are not subscribing to a particular message, the decoding should be done by hardware—
the SCSM for GOOSE performs multicast filtering at the DataLink layer. (Hou & 
Dolezilek 2008; IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 143; IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 34.) 
The compatible logical node class  is used for the monitoring of GOOSE 
messages. There shall be one instance of per GOOSE subscription for a given 
GOOSE source. It allows diagnosing the subscription state of a GOOSE message, and 
can contain optional information e.g. about the GoCB. The only mandatory data object 
in  is , status of the subscription (True = active, False = not active). (IEC 
61850-7-4 2010: 25; IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 51.) 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, the international standard IEC 61850 was studied and a simple application 
based on an open source platform was developed to enable a Wärtsilä Local Display 
Unit 20 (LDU) to communicate with a Vamp 50 protection relay using the IEC 61850 
Generic Object Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE) communication protocol. 
The  platform has been shown to be a useful (although entirely free) asset 
for learning how the hierarchical data modelling and data flow modelling is done in IEC 
61850. However, a few bugs and curiosities were found in the software—the bugs that 
were found and the settings that were done in  are listed in Appendix 6. 
The bugs have been reported to M.Sc. Steven Blair, creator of the software platform. 
Most of the bugs have already been removed from . 
The results obtained from the software testing described in Chapter 3 confirm that we 
had succeeded in our objective of developing an application that enables the LDU to 
transmit and receive GOOSE messages. Although the created software cannot be used 
for real-life applications, its development has given valuable experience on IEC 61850.  
5.1. Discussion 
Many difficulties were encountered during the study of IEC 61850. The different parts 
of IEC 61850 were written by different groups of people from different countries, each 
of which left its own mark on the grammar, thus obstructing the interpretation of the 
standard. In general, IEC 61850 can be deemed as a standard hard to grasp. The text is, 
occasionally, very confusing to a reader who is not a domain expert, and many diagrams 
are more confusing than helpful. Additionally, the abstract nature of the ACSI has an 
obvious drawback in that it provides little information on how it should be implemented 
in practice. 
Besides being the most informative part, IEC 61850-7-1 was also the most problematic 
part of the standard, due to its many ambiguities. The following statement can be found 
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on page 82: “Since many DATA classes use the same details (ATTRIBUTES), these 
details are therefore collected for re-use in common data classes (common to many 
DATA classes).” The statement is problematic for two reasons: Firstly, the word 
“ATTRIBUTES” might refer to both data attributes and to the attributes of a class 
model (i.e., not necessarily data attributes). The second problem is the reference to the 
“DATA” class, which does not exist in the second edition of IEC 61850-7-2, because 
the class name has apparently been changed from  to . 
The relations between the compatible data objects, the , the 
common data classes, and the data attributes were not easily settled. The definitions are 
spread out all over IEC 61850-7-1. Fortunately (Liang & Campbell 2008) and 
(Mackiewicz 2006) provided their own viewpoints, which helped to clarify these 
relations. 
IEC 61850-7-1 states on page 64 that “... must be defined in at least one logical 
device”. Presumably, it means that if a physical device contains several logical devices, 
at least one of them must contain an . IEC 61850-7-2 states on page 38 that “Each 
GenLogicalDeviceClass shall have one and only one logical-node-zero () and it 
may have no or several other LogicalNodes.” Although there is no specific mention of 
the , it is clearly not mandatory in every logical device. (Liang & Campbell 2008) 
states the following: “Besides the regular logical nodes for functions, the standard also 
requires every logical device to have two specific logical nodes: Logical Node Zero 
(LN0) and , which correspond to the logical device and the physical device, 
alternatively.” This (incorrect) statement might be due to changes made between the 
first and the second edition of the standard. Most of the scientific articles that were 
studied refer to the first edition. 
It is not entirely obvious what the TPAA and MCAA represent in practice, as only the 
MAC address and the Application ID for the GOOSE messages to be received needed 
to be configured to realize communication. (Blair 2013) suggests that the TPAA and 
MCAA are just conceptual associations which exist when the communication is 
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configured correctly, and that it is up to the SCSM to ensure that the requirements for 
either TPAA or MCAA are met.  
What the SCSM corresponds to in  is also not obvious. (Blair 2013) 
suggests that the entire GOOSE packet generation done by the  library is 
the SCSM and that the GOOSE retransmission scheme is a part of it. The retransmission 
is implemented in the SCSM instead of the GoCB because platform-dependent timers 
are needed to realize the algorithm. (Blair 2013.) 
I was not able to find a sensible definition as to what a “server” is. IEC 61850-6 states 
the following on page 24: “Typically, a switch controller LN may receive data as a 
client from a process bus, and provide data as a server to the inter-bay bus” which seem 
to suggest that the server is a logical node. However, the server is modelled as its own 
hierarchy level in the SCL, and many different sources state that it is the physical device 
that is defined as a server. 
There seems to be some inconsistencies regarding the mapping of the GSE management 
profile in IEC 61850-8-1. Table 36 on page 58 tells that the GSE management profile 
shall implement the ACSI TPAA. However, tables 7 and 8 on pages 29 and 30, 
respectively, gives application profiles and transport profiles for GSE management/ 
GOOSE which bypass the Session, Transport and Network layers and thereby avoids 
any possibility of connection-oriented communication. I have assumed that the SCSM 
for a specific protocol implements the application profiles and transport profiles given 
for that protocol. 
Some efforts have been made to reduce the ambiguities in IEC 61850, like the 
publishing of the IEC 61850-9-2LE guideline document which specifies the sampling 
rates of merging units. The specifications of IEC 61850 in general are still too loose to 
guarantee interoperability between IEDs from different manufacturers. Loosely defined 
and ambiguous specifications easily lead to a variety of proprietary versions of IEC 
61850 that are not necessarily interoperable.  
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The technical issues (Tissues) website
27
 is used to share information about the definition 
and use of IEC 61850. The site lists the technical issues found by various users and their 
proposals for improvements. Tissues are used as a basis for the next edition of the 
standard. 
5.2. Future work 
The developed software supports only a subset of the functionalities of IEC 61850, and 
more work is therefore required to make a module fully support the standard. However, 
the good results obtained from the software testing justify further research and 
development. Three different alternatives have been suggested for future work: 
1. develop the  platform to support all the required functionalities,  
2. replace  with a commercial communication stack that implements 
the required functionalities, or 
3. develop a new communication stack from scratch. 
Some of the missing functionalities in  are the trigger options for the 
GOOSE control block, a GOOSE retransmission scheme based on a state machine 
capable of real-time operation, validation of received messages, and the MMS services. 
Some examples of vendors providing commercial communication stacks are:  
 Triangle Microworks Inc.28 provides IEC 61850 source code libraries written in 
C. An IEC 61850 Test Suite is also available. 
 INFO TECH29 provides an IEC 61850 software library written in C. 
                                                          
27
 http://www.tissues.iec61850.com/parts.mspx 
28
 http://www.trianglemicroworks.com/documents/IEC_61850_Source_Code_Libraries.pdf 
29
 http://www.infotech.pl/ 
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Regardless of which path that will be followed in future work, the SCL language should 
be studied more thoroughly than what was done in this thesis. Definitions of all SCL 
elements and attributes are available in IEC 61850-6, but these were ignored. The 
development of the SCD file mainly followed the “trial and error” method.  
An important issue that needs to be considered when implementing IEC 61850 for 
commercial applications is the conformance to part 10 of the standard. IEC 61850-10 
‘Conformance testing’ specifies (IEC 61850-10 2005: 6-7): 
 standard techniques for testing of conformance of implementations,  
 abstract test cases for conformance testing of devices, 
 specific measurement techniques to be applied when declaring performance 
parameters, and  
 the metrics to be measured within devices according to the requirements defined 
in IEC 61850-5. 
Information on tests regarding EMC requirements and environmental conditions can be 
found in IEC 61850-3. (IEC 61850-10 2005: 6.) 
(Vähämäki 2013) states that an official conformance test is currently not required—a 
product can be advertised as being IEC 61850 conformant even if no official 
conformance test has been performed on it. Customers may however require that the 
vendor supplies a document called a Conformance Statement which provides the IEC 
61850 conformance details of a product, i.e., it lists the aspects of the standard that are 
supported. The Conformance Statement consists of the following sections (VAMP 
2011): 
 The Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) lists the ACSI 
conformance statements, i.e., what aspects of the ACSI that are supported by the 
product, and the protocol profile support, i.e., what application profiles and 
transport profiles are supported. 
 The Model Implementation Conformance Statement (MICS) lists the application 
functions supported by the server, i.e., the supported logical nodes classes from 
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IEC 61850-7-4. It also lists supported logical node type extensions, common 
data class type extensions, and enumerated type extensions.  
 The Protocol Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (PIXIT)30 lists the 
extra information on the IEC 61850 server implementation, for example the 
retransmission intervals, the maximum number of elements in GOOSE publisher 
DataSets, and the trigger options. 
 The Tissue Implementation Conformance Statement (TICS) lists the 
implemented technical issues corrections found on the Tissues website. 
The PICS, MICS, PIXIT and TICS might have to be delivered as separate documents on 
request of the customer. (Vähämäki 2013.) 
An official conformance test
31
 can be performed on an individual product by an 
independent test laboratory. The testing is done according to the IEC 61850-10 and the 
Conformance Statement of the product. A test lab with a certified ISO 9000
32
 or ISO 
17025 quality system can award a product a Level A certificate after the product has 
successfully passed a series of tests. The test is based on the UCA International Users 
Group Device Test Procedures version 2.2b. The Level A certificate proves that the 
product has not shown to be non-conforming to those parts of the IEC 61850 standard 
that the product is claimed to conform to in its Conformance Statement. (KEMA 2011.) 
                                                          
30
 Contains system specific information regarding the capabilities of the system to be tested which 
are outside the scope of the IEC 61850 series. Provides information regarding the physical 
setup that is not part of the ACSI. This could be information regarding the hardware, socket, 
and other information. The PIXIT shall not be subjected to standardization. (IEC 61850-2 2003: 
20.) 
31
 Check of data flow on communication channels in accordance with the standard conditions 
concerning access organization, formats and bit sequences, time synchronization, timing, signal 
form and level and reaction to errors. (IEC 61850-2 2003: 7.) 
32
 The conformance test should be carried out by an ISO 9001 certified organization or system 
integrator. (IEC 61850-2 2003: 7.) 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1. Application profiles and transport profiles 
The application profile and transport profile used for client/server communication in 
IEC 61850 are given in Table 7 and Table 8, respectively. There are 2 transport profiles 
that may be used by the client/server application profile: TCP/IP or OSI. An 
implementation that claims conformance to IEC 61850 shall implement the TCP/IP 
profile as a minimum. (IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 26.) 
Table 7. Services and protocols for client/server communication application profile. 
(IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 26.) 
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Table 8. Services and protocols for client/server TCP/IP transport profile. (IEC 61850-
8-1 2011: 27.) 
 
The application profile and transport profile for GSE Management/GOOSE 
communication are given in Table 9 and Table 10, respectively.  The GSE 
Management/GOOSE communication profile shall be used for any implementation 
claiming conformance to IEC 61850 and declaring support for one of the services given 
in Table 11. (IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 29.) 
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Table 9. Service and protocols for GSE Management and GOOSE communication 
application profile. (IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 29.) 
 
Table 10. Service and protocols for GSE Management and GOOSE communication 
transport profile (IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 30.) 
 
Table 11. Services requiring GSE Management and GOOSE communication profile. 
(IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 29.) 
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APPENDIX 2. The SCD file used in the GOOSE software project 
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APPENDIX 3. The main.c file used in the GOOSE software project 
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APPENDIX 4. Retransmission algorithm walkthrough step by step 
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APPENDIX 5. The Manufacturing Message Specification protocol 
The Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) is an object oriented Application 
layer messaging protocol and a comprehensive standard containing multiple objects and 
services. IEC has chosen to map the ACSI class models and service models to MMS 
because it  
 has a proven implementation track record, 
 provides the required information modelling methods and services, 
 supports the complex naming of IEC 61850 objects, and 
 can operate over the full TCP/IP or OSI stacks . 
Despite its name, the MMS standard does not contain any manufacturing specific 
definitions. In fact, it is very generic. Mapping of the ACSI to MMS is quite 
straightforward. (IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 14; Schwarz 2008: 2, 4; Mackiewicz 2006.) 
MMS contains object classes such as , ,  
and , and services such as read, write, report, download and read journal. The 
main MMS object is called Virtual Manufacturing Device (), and it contains all the 
other objects. The  represents a virtual interface to a real device by hiding the 
underlying implementation details, as depicted in Figure 39. It represents the part of an 
application that a client can access—a client can browse all the objects of the  and 
read all the attributes through MMS services. The attributes of all objects together 
represent a self-description of the device. The self-description can thus be downloaded 
by a software tool. (Schwarz 2008: 4-7.) 
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Figure 39. The  hides the concrete implementation of a device, i.e., it represents a 
virtual interface to a real device. A client can download the self-description of a 
device through MMS services. (Schwarz 2008: 6.) 
The MMS environment is created through the establishment of a single TPAA, which is 
created and maintained via the client/server communication profile. An instance of an 
ACSI server class is mapped one-to-one to at least one . Each  is assigned 
one or more communication addresses that each create a SAP through which MMS 
services can be exchanged. The mapping makes the  represent the capabilities of 
the server on the network. From the point of view of the client, only the server with its 
objects and its behaviour is defined and visible. The MMS server also contains files and 
client associations. (IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 32, 55, 58; Schwarz 2008: 5-6.) 
An instance of a logical device is mapped to a MMS  object, which acquires the 
name of the logical device. An instance of a logical node, data object, data attribute, or 
control block class maps to a  object, and a DataSet is mapped to a 
, as given in Table 12. The  class of MMS allows 
structuring any information provided for access by an application. (IEC 61850-8-1 
2011: 32, 56, 65; IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 127; Schwarz 2008: 5.)  
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Table 12. Mapping of the objects defined in parts 7-2, 7-3 and 7-4 of IEC 61850 to 
MMS protocol objects. (IEC 61850-7-1 2011: 127.) 
 
The content (semantic of the exchanged information) of the  is not 
specified by the MMS standard, allowing the semantics of the ACSI class models to be 
used. The references of the MMS  are created through the 
concatenation of the  component names. Each level of hierarchy of the 
data model is separated by the  character. MMS maps the FC value to the object 
reference, between the logical node name and data object name. As an example, the 
reference of an instance of the data attribute  of a circuit breaker is created through 
the concatenation of several MMS  objects residing at different 
hierarchy levels, as illustrated in Figure 40. (Schwarz 2008: 5; IEC 61850-8-1 2011: 34, 
93.) 
Although MMS has many technical advantages, it fails to meet the requirements set for 
implementing GOOSE, mainly due to its lack of support for the publisher/subscriber 
architecture and its relatively slow performance. (Ozansoy 2006: 34, 122.) 
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Figure 40. Example of an object reference in the MMS domain, created through the 
concatenation of the  object names at different hierarchy levels. 
Unlike the object references in the IEC 61850 domain, the FC is mapped between 
the logical node and data object names, and object names are separated by the  
character. (Mackiewicz 2006.) 
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APPENDIX 6. Settings and bugs in Rapid61850 
 Timestamping was turned on by setting  to 1 in 
 
 The type of variable  in function  in 
 had to be changed from  to . This is 
probably due to the properties of the LDU. 
 Wrong endianness in  caused the Application ID of GOOSE messages 
to acquire erroneous values and was therefore fixed by commenting: 
 
 could not be defined because a source file linked in by the 
compiler already defined . It is therefore an LDU and  
cross-compiler related problem. 
 It was discovered that  sets the default VLAN identifier to 4 in 
. The problem was solved by setting the value to 0. 
 Function  in : The  for  was 
incorrectly mapped by  and used the name of the logical device in 
IED : “” was corrected to 
“”. Also the value of  (19) had 
to be changed to 22 to match the amount of characters in the corrected . 
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 In the SCD code, IED  has two data attributes in its DataSet (virtual 
inputs corresponding to buttons  and  on the front panel of Vamp 50) the 
values of which are sent as a GOOSE message when either button is pressed. 
IED  has an input that references only one of these data attributes (). 
However, IED  can read the values of both data attributes in the received 
GOOSE message. 
 
